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GOOD CONDUCT TIME FOR PRISONERS: 
WHY (AND HOW) WISCONSIN SHOULD 
PROVIDE CREDITS TOWARD EARLY 
RELEASE 
MICHAEL O’HEAR* 
Wisconsin is one of about twenty states not offering good conduct 
time (GCT) to prisoners.  In most states, prisoners are able to earn GCT 
credits toward accelerated release through good behavior.  Wisconsin 
itself had GCT for more than a century, but eliminated it as part of a set 
of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s that left the state with what may be the 
nation’s most inflexible system for the release of prisoners.  Although 
some of these reforms helpfully brought greater certainty to punishment, 
they went too far in eliminating nearly all meaningful recognition and 
encouragement of good behavior and rehabilitative progress.  This Essay 
explains why and how Wisconsin should reinstitute GCT, drawing on 
social scientific research on the effects of GCT, public opinion surveys in 
Wisconsin and across the United States regarding sentencing policy, and 
an analysis of the GCT laws in place in other jurisdictions.  Although the 
Essay focuses particularly on Wisconsin’s circumstances, the basic 
argument for GCT is more generally applicable, and much of the analysis 
should be of interest to policymakers in other states, too. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 488 
II.  WISCONSIN’S PATH TO HYPER-DETERMINACY ............................. 492 
A.  Hyper-Indeterminacy, 1889–1984 .............................................. 492 
B. Moderate Indeterminacy, 1984–1999 ......................................... 496 
C. Hyper-Determinacy, 1999–2009 ................................................. 498 
D.  Moderate Determinacy, 2009–2011 ........................................... 504 
E.  Hyper-Determinacy: Destination or Detour? ........................... 508 
III.  THE DUBIOUS CASE FOR HYPER-DETERMINACY ........................ 510 
A.  Democratic Accountability ......................................................... 510 
B.  Victim Rights ............................................................................... 513 
C.  Public Safety ................................................................................ 516 
 
*  Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Marquette University Law School.  B.A., 
J.D. Yale University. 
 488 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:487 
IV.  PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INDETERMINACY AND GOOD  
  CONDUCT TIME ................................................................................. 522 
A.  Support for Indeterminacy in Wisconsin .................................. 522 
B. Support for Indeterminacy in the Nation as a Whole ............ 526 
V.  GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ........................ 529 
A.  Overview ...................................................................................... 529 
B.  Specific Jurisdictions .................................................................. 532 
1.  Federal System ................................................................... 532 
2.  Illinois  .......................................................................... 534 
3.  Washington ......................................................................... 536 
VI.  GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ............ 538 
VII.  A PROPOSAL FOR GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN WISCONSIN ............ 542 
A.  The Case for Good Conduct Time: A Recapitulation ............. 542 
B.  How to Structure Good Conduct Time in Wisconsin .............. 544 
1.  Maximum Amount of GCT Discount ............................. 544 
2.  Conditions for Earning GCT ............................................ 545 
3.  Offense-Based Exclusions and Limitations .................... 547 
4.  Disciplinary Sanctions ....................................................... 547 
5.  Deferral of GCT Release .................................................. 548 
6.  Relationship to Extended Supervision ............................ 549 
7.  Fair Notice .......................................................................... 550 
8.  Effective Date and Retroactivity ..................................... 550 
C.  Differences From 2009 Reforms ................................................ 551 
VIII. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 552 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a person commits a wrong against his community, that person 
deserves to be censured and even, in extreme cases, to be physically 
excluded from the community.  However, when the wrongdoer fully 
atones for his bad conduct, he deserves no less to be restored to full 
membership in the community.  Even in cases of great harm, where full 
atonement may seem impossible, the wrongdoer’s efforts to achieve 
some meaningful degree of atonement should be recognized and 
encouraged by the community.  The tireless quest for the lost sheep, the 
joyful welcoming of the prodigal son—these parables resonate deeply in 
western culture and highlight our obligation not merely to condemn 
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wrongdoing, but also to do what we can to make reconciliation possible 
and to restore the wrongdoer to the community.1 
This intuitive moral logic underlay the Supreme Court’s 
extraordinary decision in Graham v. Florida, which banned the sentence 
of life without the possibility of parole for most crimes committed by 
juveniles.2  In explaining why this sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Court 
observed that the sentence denies  
any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter what 
[the offender] might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he 
committed as a teenager are not representative of his true 
character, even if he spends the next half century attempting to 
atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes.3   
The prisoner’s efforts to improve himself and atone for his wrongdoing, 
the Court suggests, should be reciprocated by society through a 
meaningful consideration of early release.4 
A similar moral logic points to the essential injustice of any 
sentencing system that is wholly devoid of any flexibility as to release 
dates.  In the 1990s, dozens of states adopted laws that substantially 
curtailed parole, which had long been the standard mechanism in the 
United States for recognizing and encouraging good conduct and 
rehabilitative progress by prisoners.5  However, few of these “truth in 
sentencing” (TIS) laws entirely eliminated back-end flexibility.  For 
instance, many states limited the new parole restrictions to their most 
serious violent offenders.6  Moreover, even for the violent offenders, 
about half of the TIS laws preserved some possibility of parole.7  Among 
the remaining states that eliminated parole, nearly all retained the 
 
1.  For a more extensive statement of these ideas about atonement and its relationship 
to punishment, see Michael M. O’Hear, Solving the Good-Time Puzzle: Why Following the 
Rules Should Get You Out of Prison Early, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 195, 214–22. 
2.  130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
3.  Id. at 2033. 
4.  See id.  For a more complete discussion of this aspect of Graham, see Michael M. 
O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087, 
1101–05 (2013). 
5.  See WILLIAM J. SABOL, KATHERINE ROSICH, KAMALA MALLIK KANE, DAVID P. 
KIRK & GLENN DUBIN, URBAN INST., THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING 
REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 7 
(2002). 
6.  Id. at 9. 
7.  Id. at 20. 
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possibility of “good conduct time” (GCT) release—that is, early release 
based on the accumulation of credits for good behavior in prison.8  
Typically, these states permitted release at the eighty-five percent mark 
(assuming all possible GCT credits were earned), while three states set 
even earlier release possibilities.9 
In 1998, Wisconsin adopted what may have been the nation’s most 
rigid TIS law.  The law was distinctive in combining three features: (1) it 
was not limited to serious violent crimes, but covered all felonies; (2) it 
not just scaled back but entirely eliminated the possibility of parole 
release; and (3) it made no allowance for early release based on good 
conduct time.10  Another aspect of the law greatly enhanced the 
practical significance of the new system’s extraordinary inflexibility: 
statutory maximum sentences were raised across the board.11  The 
predictable result was a dramatic increase in the real length of time that 
Wisconsin prisoners were required to serve.12  The enhancement of the 
statutory maxima was only partly undone by trailer legislation in 2002, 
which also made a small gesture in the direction of back-end flexibility 
by creating a new opportunity for judicial sentence modification.13  
Modest in design, this new provision has been rarely utilized in 
practice.14  Wisconsin continues to have what may be the nation’s most 
extreme TIS system.15 
Wisconsin’s TIS law has often been criticized, and rightfully so, as a 
colossal waste of taxpayer money16—a contributor to a bloated state 
prison population that is twice that of neighboring Minnesota’s, despite 
the remarkably similar size and crime rates of the two states.17  
 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. at 21–23. 
10.  Michael M. O’Hear & Darren Wheelock, Imprisonment Inertia and Public Attitudes 
Toward “Truth in Sentencing,” 2015 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 11), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418282, archived at http://per
ma.cc/F9UZ-8XCM.  
11.  Id. 
12.  Mary Zahn & Gina Barton, Locked In: The Price of Truth in Sentencing, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2004, at 1A. 
13.  O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 17–18).  
14.  Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early Assessments and State-Level 
Strategies, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1551, 1582 n.148 (2012). 
15.  See, e.g., Zahn & Barton, supra note 12. 
16.  See, e.g., id. (estimating cost of TIS as $1.8 billion for inmates admitted through 
2025). 
17.  Michael M. O’Hear, Mass Incarceration in Three Midwestern States: Origins and 
Trends, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 709, 717–19, 735, 740 (2013).  
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However, the fundamental flaw of the Wisconsin system is not fiscal in 
nature, but ethical.  The TIS laws of other states have preserved 
meaningful opportunities for inmates to earn early release, even if these 
opportunities are now significantly more limited than they were a 
generation ago.18  To varying degrees, these other TIS laws embody a 
hope and expectation that prisoners will work to better themselves 
during their time behind bars.  They send a message that society will 
recognize rehabilitative progress and positive behavior and would like 
to welcome prisoners back to the community sooner rather than later.  
Wisconsin’s law, by contrast, sends the harshly dismissive message that 
nothing much is expected of prisoners—that society simply wishes to 
exclude them for as long as possible.  Wisconsin’s TIS sentences are 
cruel for much the same reason as the sentences found unconstitutional 
in Graham: they deny “any meaningful opportunity” to obtain early 
release, “no matter what [the offender] might do to demonstrate that 
[his] bad acts . . . are not representative of his true character,” and no 
matter how hard he might work at “attempting to atone for his crimes 
and learn from his mistakes.”19 
To be clear, I do not intend to argue in this Essay that TIS sentences 
are unconstitutional; tilting at that particular windmill can await another 
day.  Rather, my present purpose is to argue for legislative change to an 
exceptionally harsh sentencing system.  Legislators, no less than judges, 
should be mindful of the ethical significance of the penal laws they 
adopt and maintain. 
To argue that Wisconsin’s TIS system has gone too far is not 
necessarily to seek a return to the pre-TIS system of largely 
uncontrolled and unpredictable parole release.20  My aim is considerably 
more modest: the institution of a new system of good conduct time 
credits that would permit release, at the earliest, after an inmate has 
served two-thirds of his prison sentence.  Such a system would restore 
meaningful recognition of good behavior in prison, but would still avoid 
the worst vices of the old system, which permitted release as early as the 
one-quarter mark of the sentence. 
The Essay proceeds as follows.  Part II briefly recapitulates the 
history of parole, good conduct time, and truth in sentencing in 
Wisconsin.  Part III critically examines the case that has been made for 
 
18.  See SABOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 18–23. 
19.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).  
20.  The pre-TIS system is described in more detail in Part II below. 
 492 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:487 
truth in sentencing in Wisconsin.  Part IV examines polling research and 
demonstrates that GCT is consistent with the values and policy 
preferences of most Wisconsin voters.  Part V surveys the widespread 
use of GCT in other U.S. jurisdictions.  Part VI considers what the 
empirical literature has to say about GCT, highlighting the potential for 
GCT to reduce prison misconduct, recidivism, and corrections budgets.  
Part VII presents a specific proposal for reinstituting GCT in Wisconsin.  
Finally, Part VIII concludes. 
II. WISCONSIN’S PATH TO HYPER-DETERMINACY 
Over the past generation, Wisconsin has had four distinct regimes 
governing release dates from prison.  These regimes have varied 
considerably in their determinacy—that is, the degree of certainty at the 
time a sentence is imposed about how much time the defendant will 
actually serve behind bars before release.  Schematically, these regimes 
might be conceptualized as lying on a continuum: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Part briefly describes each of Wisconsin’s four recent regimes 
and then considers what lessons may be drawn from the history. 
A. Hyper-Indeterminacy, 1889–1984 
For most of the twentieth century, Wisconsin’s corrections system 
might be fairly described as one of hyper-indeterminacy.  The system’s 
roots lie deep in the nineteenth century, reflecting certain fundamental 
changes in American penal practices and attitudes during that time 
period. 
Hyper-
Indeterminacy 
Hyper-
Determinacy 
Midpoint 
Moderate 
Indeterminacy 
Moderate 
Determinacy 
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In the years between the Revolution and the Civil War, 
imprisonment largely displaced execution, public whipping, and other 
forms of corporal punishment as the standard sentence for serious 
crimes in the United States.21  For as long as there have been prisons, 
however, corrections officials have struggled to maintain institutional 
order.22  Initially, the whip was the chief enforcer of discipline.23  
However, whipping behind prison walls provoked some of the same 
criticisms as had whipping in the public square—criticisms grounded in 
humanitarian sensibilities and hopes for offender rehabilitation.24  As 
two keen observers of the early penitentiaries queried,  
To what point are corporal chastisements reconcilable with the 
object of the penitentiary system itself, which is the reformation 
of the guilty?  If this pain be ignominious, does it not go directly 
against the end which we propose to obtain, viz., to awaken the 
morality of an individual, fallen in his own opinion?25 
By the 1850s, prison reformers seeking more humane and effective 
techniques for maintaining discipline hit upon the idea of good conduct 
time.26  The award of credits toward early release created a positive 
incentive for prisoners to follow prison rules, while the threat of losing 
credits already earned created a negative incentive that seemed less 
barbarous than the whip.27 
Following the national trend, the Wisconsin Legislature adopted 
good conduct time in 1860.28  For each month of good conduct, the State 
Prison Commissioner was authorized to reduce an inmate’s sentence by 
as many as five days, subject to annulment by the Governor for 
subsequent misconduct.29  Highlighting the Legislature’s reintegrationist 
 
21.  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73–
75, 77–82 (1993). 
22.  See, e.g., G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY 
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 39–47 (Francis Lieber 
trans. 1833) (discussing disciplinary techniques at earliest American penitentiaries). 
23.  Id. at 41–42. 
24.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 74, 76 (describing nineteenth-century criticisms of 
public whipping). 
25.  DE BEAUMONT & DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 22, at 44. 
26.  THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY 
OF CONTROL 75 (2010). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Act Relating to the Discipline of Convicts in the State Prisons, ch. 324, 1860 Wis. 
Laws 321. 
29.  Id. § 1, 1860 Wis. Laws at 321–22. 
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aims, the same enactment also gave corrections officials the authority to 
reward an inmate’s record of “good character for obedience, industry 
and integrity” with a restoration of citizenship upon release from 
prison.30 
The adoption of GCT in Wisconsin and other states foreshadowed a 
far more dramatic expansion of sentencing indeterminacy in the decades 
following the Civil War.  This shift was associated with the emergence of 
a new “progressive penology,” which sought to develop more scientific 
and humane approaches to offender rehabilitation.31  “Classical 
penology” had emphasized general deterrence as the overriding aim of 
punishment; this orientation called for a system of graduated penalties 
based on the severity of the offense, which left little room for varying 
the length of incarceration based on the inmate’s performance behind 
bars.32  Progressive thinkers, however, rejected the classical assumption 
that crime resulted from a rational cost–benefit calculus by criminals.33  
The progressives saw little point in using punishment to try to send 
finely calibrated deterrence messages to the general public, but were 
instead more interested in identifying the individual rehabilitative needs 
of each offender and tailoring the prison experience, including its 
duration, to those needs.34 
In line with the new thinking, Wisconsin significantly expanded and 
regularized good conduct time in 1880.35  While under the 1860 law a 
prisoner might earn at most about two months of good conduct time per 
year, the 1880 law permitted a full six months per year for longer-
serving inmates.36  Moreover, while the 1860 law had made the 
reduction of sentences purely a matter of official discretion, the 1880 law 
specified, “Every convict who . . . shall conduct himself in a peaceful and 
obedient manner, and faithfully perform all the duties required of him, 
shall be entitled to a diminution of time from the term of his sentence.”37 
 
30.  Id. § 3, 1860 Wis. Laws at 322. 
31.  BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 26, at 70–71. 
32.  Id. at 32–34. 
33.  See id. at 71. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Act to Promote Good Order and Repress Crime, ch. 238, 1880 Wis. Laws 274. 
36.  Id. § 1, 1880 Wis. Laws at 274–75; see also Act Relating to the Discipline of Convicts 
in the State Prisons, ch. 324, § 1, 1860 Wis. Laws 321, 321–22. 
37.  Act to Promote Good Order and Repress Crime § 1, 1880 Wis. Laws at 274–75 
(emphasis added). 
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Although GCT continued its national expansion in the progressive 
period, eventually becoming established in all forty-six states by 1910,38 
parole proved to be the preeminent institutional expression of the new 
penology.  The device was pioneered by New York’s Elmira 
Reformatory, which was built as a model progressive institution in 
1876.39  The hope was to “instill in offenders a self-regulated discipline 
because release dates were to be based on visible proof of reformation.  
Once satisfactory progress had been demonstrated, the offender would 
be released to enter into a period of community supervision . . . .”40  The 
idea caught on quickly, and forty-one states had parole laws in place by 
1910.41  By 1942, the final holdout states, all located in the South, were 
also on board.42 
Wisconsin’s first parole law, adopted in 1889,43 reflected the new 
national emphasis on penal flexibility.  Under this law, judges were 
authorized to impose a “general sentence of imprisonment.”44  Such a 
sentence specified no particular duration, but instead turned the 
defendant over to prison authorities for what might prove to be any 
amount of time between the statutory minimum and the statutory 
maximum “depending upon [the defendant’s] conduct and the evidences 
of [his] probable reformation.”45  Thus, for instance, a robber receiving a 
general sentence might have spent anywhere from one to seven years in 
prison,46 a child rapist anywhere from ten to thirty years,47 and an 
arsonist anywhere from three to fourteen years48—all at the discretion 
of the State Board of Supervision.49  This level of extreme uncertainty in 
release dates may fairly be characterized as “hyper-indeterminacy.” 
 
38.  BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 26, at 75. 
39.  Id. at 72–73. 
40.  Id. at 73. 
41.  Id. at 76. 
42.  Joan Petersilia, Probation and Parole, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME & 
PUNISHMENT 563, 567–68 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). 
43.  Act of April 15, 1889, ch. 390, 1889 Wis. Laws 551. 
44.  Id. § 1, 1889 Wis. Laws at 551.  Excluded were those defendants convicted of first- or 
second-degree murder who had previously been convicted of a felony and served a term of 
imprisonment.  Id. 
45.  Id. at 552. 
46.  WIS. STAT. § 4378 (1889). 
47.  Id. § 4381. 
48.  Id. § 4399. 
49.  See Act of April 15, 1889 § 1, 1889 Wis. Laws at 552. 
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Parole and good conduct time remained central pillars of the 
Wisconsin criminal justice system for many decades thereafter.  As the 
era of hyper-indeterminacy was coming to a close in the early 1980s, the 
GCT system established in 1880—a full century earlier—remained 
intact,50 augmented by the possibility of additional credits for inmates 
“whose diligence in labor or study surpasses the general average.”51  
Meanwhile, parole had been restructured a bit from its earliest form, but 
remained an area of vast discretion and indeterminacy.  Judges no 
longer imposed a “general sentence,” but set a specific term of years 
that, in effect, merely established the maximum amount of time the 
offender might serve behind bars.52  The State Department of Health 
and Social Services, which administered the prison system, could release 
an offender on parole as soon as he had served one-half of the statutory 
minimum for the offense.53  Indeed, statutory minima were not much of 
a constraint on parole since only Class A felonies included a statutory 
minimum in the state’s general felony classification system.54 
B. Moderate Indeterminacy, 1984–1999 
In Wisconsin and elsewhere, regimes of hyper-indeterminacy 
reflected the ascendance of progressive penology through much of the 
twentieth century.  However, indeterminacy and progressive penology 
came under sustained attack from both the Left and the Right in the 
1970s, and states increasingly looked for new approaches.  From the 
Left, criticisms focused on the need for fairer processes and more 
uniform treatment of similar cases; all of the discretion that went along 
with parole seemed to invite arbitrary or discriminatory decision 
making.55  From the Right, the call was for toughness—an end to the 
coddling of criminals by soft-hearted judges and corrections officials, 
particularly against the backdrop of long-term, dramatic increases in the 
American crime rate in the 1960s and 1970s.56  Underlying both lines of 
criticism was an emerging consensus that corrections officials were 
 
50.  WIS. STAT. § 53.11(1) (1981–1982). 
51.  Id. § 53.12(1).  Under this provision, good conduct time was earned at a rate of one 
day for each six days of above-average diligence.  Id. 
52.  See id. § 973.01(1). 
53.  Id. § 57.06(1). 
54.  Id. § 939.50(3). 
55.  Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 141, 151–52 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013). 
56.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 404, 411–12, 449–52. 
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simply incapable of reliably rehabilitating criminals through the 
progressive model of individualized evaluation and treatment.57   
In response to these criticisms, five states eliminated discretionary 
parole between 1975 and 1983.58  Wisconsin’s Legislature gave serious 
consideration to doing the same in 1980, but a bill to that effect was 
ultimately defeated by conservatives who were holding out for 
something even tougher.59 
Wisconsin reformers proved more successful in 1984, perhaps aided 
by a temporary abatement of tough-on-crime politics in the state.60  The 
state first adopted voluntary sentencing guidelines for judges, which 
were intended to reduce disparities in punishment while preserving 
judicial sentencing discretion.61  Then, just two weeks later, Democratic 
Governor Anthony Earl signed into law new restrictions on parole.62  As 
with the sentencing guidelines bill, liberal Democratic Representative 
David Travis served as lead sponsor of the parole legislation,63 which 
reflected the Left’s process-based critique of the old indeterminate 
system more than the Right’s toughness agenda.  The new law included 
three key features: (1) corrections officials could no longer hold inmates 
until the end of their imposed sentences, but were now required to 
release inmates on parole no later than the two-thirds mark of the 
sentence (the “mandatory release date”);64 (2) corrections officials were 
now required to hold inmates until they had reached at least the one-
quarter mark of the sentence or six months, whichever was greater;65 
and (3) prisoners in state custody lost the ability to earn good conduct 
time.66   
 
57.  JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 168–70 (1975).  
58.  Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, in 26 CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 479, 496 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999). 
59.  See WIS. FELONY SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM., REPORT OF THE WISCONSIN 
FELONY SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMITTEE 11–12 (1983) (noting that bill to eliminate 
parole was defeated and replaced with bill calling for new mandatory minimum sentences).  
60.  See id. at 13 (noting that sentencing was not a decisive issue in gubernatorial or 
legislative races in 1982 and that debate over sentencing discretion had “abated”). 
61.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 84-4: THE 
FELONY SENTENCING GUIDELINES LAW 9–10 (1984).  
62.  Act of May 10, 1984, 1983 Wis. Act 528, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 2104. 
63.  Id. (parole reform); Act of April 25, 1984, 1983 Wis. Act 371, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 
1625 (guidelines). 
64.  1983 Wis. Act 528, § 2, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws at 2105. 
65.  Id. § 18, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws at 2107. 
66.  Id. § 2, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws at 2105. 
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These changes established a new system that might be fairly labeled 
“moderate indeterminacy.”  For instance, in the new system, an offender 
sentenced by a judge to twelve years in prison might get out any time 
between three years and eight years.  Although such a sentence still had 
considerable indeterminacy, the new system nonetheless contrasted 
markedly with the old, in which the same sentence might have resulted 
in any amount of time in prison up to twelve years. 
C. Hyper-Determinacy, 1999–2009 
Wisconsin’s system of moderate indeterminacy proved much less 
durable than the prior system of hyper-indeterminacy.  The sentencing 
regime adopted in 1984 was doomed by a decade-long spike in violent 
crime; a related, massive increase in the size of the state’s prison 
population; and an intensification of political partisanship in the area of 
penal policy. 
As indicated in Figure 1, Wisconsin’s violent crime rate increased 
sharply between 1960 and 1980, temporarily leveled off in the early 
1980s, and then climbed to a new peak in 1995—a peak that was nearly 
ten times higher than the 1963 valley.  Chronically high levels of violent 
crime in the 1990s helped to fuel public distrust of the criminal justice 
system and provided the impetus for a plethora of new tough-on-crime 
laws.67 
Even without an increase in toughness, a surge in violent crime 
would have produced a surge in imprisonment, and that is precisely 
what Wisconsin experienced.  As indicated in Figure 2, Wisconsin’s 
imprisonment rate grew every single year from 1972 through 2003, and 
then hit an all-time high in 2006, reaching a level more than nine times 
that of the early 1970s.  Such explosive growth pushed Wisconsin’s 
prison system into a position of chronic overcrowding, even 
notwithstanding an extraordinary prison-building boom.68 
  
 
67.  See, e.g., Act of April 13, 1994, 1993 Wis. Act 281, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 1087; Act of 
December 10, 1993, 1993 Wis. Act 97, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 637; Act of August 3, 1989, 1989 
Wis. Act 31, 1989 Wis. Sess. Laws 54.  
68.  In 1974, Wisconsin’s prison population was below the state’s total designed bed 
capacity, but by 1982 the population had grown to 120% of capacity.  See WIS. DIV. OF 
CORR., FISCAL YEAR SUMMARY REPORT OF POPULATION MOVEMENT, at tbl.1 (1974); WIS. 
LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, ADULT AND JUVENILE CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS, at 
Attachment II (1983).  Beds increased by more than 50% in the next decade, but the system 
only fell further behind; by 1992, the prison population was nearly 130% of capacity.  WIS. 
DEP’T OF CORR., FISCAL YEAR SUMMARY OF POPULATION MOVEMENT, at tbl.1 (1992). 
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Figure 1 
Wisconsin violent crime per 100,000 residents, 1960–201069 
 
 
  
 
69.  “Violent crime” refers here to the four violent “index” crimes tracked by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation: homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.  The data 
come from the FBI’s annual reports entitled Crime in the United States, which are available 
back to 1995.  Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/ab
out-us/cjis/ucr/ucr (last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/97ML-Y7SD.  Older 
reports are available online from LLMC Digital. LAW LIB. MICROFORM CONSORTIUM, 
http://www.llmcdigital.org/titleresults.aspx?searchtype=0&set=80524&volume=&part=&page 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4AF-436K. 
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Figure 2 
Wisconsin imprisonment per 100,000, 1972–201170 
 
 
  
 
70.  “Imprisonment” here refers only to those incarcerated persons sentenced to prison 
and does not include those incarcerated in local jails.  Older data come from PATRICK A. 
LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN STATE 
AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925–86 (1988).  More recent data come from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics’ annual Prisoners reports. Publications & Products: Prisoners, 
BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=40 (last visited Nov. 7, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/99VG-H6XT. 
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Fortunately for the new Department of Corrections (DOC), which 
was carved out of the Department of Health and Social Services in 
1990,71 a few safety valves were available to prevent a complete system 
meltdown.  One such safety valve was the Intensive Sanctions Program 
(ISP), created by the Legislature in 1991 to address overcrowding by 
establishing an intermediate option between prison and regular parole 
supervision.72  Through the early and mid-1990s, the DOC released 
hundreds of inmates to the ISP each year, and used the ISP as an 
alternative to revocation for even greater numbers of probationers and 
parolees.73  However, the DOC was criticized for failing to screen and 
supervise ISP participants adequately.74  Eventually, in 1997, an ISP 
participant was arrested for a double-homicide, which provoked a 
political and media firestorm, with leading Democrats trying to pin the 
responsibility on Republican Governor Tommy Thompson.75   
But the most important safety valve, by far, was discretionary 
parole—even in its constrained, post-1984 form.  An absence of 
objective parole criteria meant that the DOC’s Parole Commission had 
considerable freedom to liberalize release in times of prison 
overcrowding.76  And, sure enough, as prison admissions exploded in the 
1990s, the parole safety valve was soon opened wide, and it became 
almost unheard of for Wisconsin inmates to remain in prison until their 
mandatory release dates.77  As a result of this liberalization, the average 
prison time served before release dropped by seven percent between 
1990 and 1998, even though the average prison sentence increased by 
 
71.  Act of August 3, 1989, 1989 Wis. Act 31, § 3023, 1989 Wis. Sess. Laws 54, 697. 
72.  TOMMY G. THOMPSON, POWER TO THE PEOPLE: AN AMERICAN STATE AT WORK 
183–84 (1996).  
73.  INTENSIVE SANCTIONS REVIEW PANEL, FINAL REPORT: SUBMITTED TO 
GOVERNOR TOMMY G. THOMPSON 7 (1998). 
74.  Id. at 3. 
75.  Jim Stingl, Suspect Triggered 158 Alerts, Log Shows, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
Aug. 28, 1997, at 1B.  
76.  Patrick J. Fiedler, The Wisconsin Department of Corrections: An Expensive 
Proposition, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 501, 513–15 (1993). 
77.  In 1990, more than forty percent of the males released from prison in Wisconsin 
were required to wait until their mandatory release date, but in 1991, that figure dropped to 
less than thirty percent, and in 1992, to less than fifteen percent.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL 
BUREAU, INFORMATION PAPER #53: ADULT CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 6 tbl.III (1993).  
Mandatory releases eventually dropped below ten percent in 1994 and remained low through 
the mid-1990s.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATION PAPER #54: ADULT 
CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 11 tbl.4 (1997). 
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eight percent in the same time period.78  As these trends became 
publicized, parole, like the ISP, became a lightning rod of controversy.79 
Even Governor Thompson, who was in a sense responsible for the 
liberalization of parole,80 recognized that early release for prisoners cut 
against the grain of tough-on-crime politics, which were intensifying 
considerably in the 1990s.81  Running for reelection in 1994, Thompson 
himself vowed to end parole for violent criminals.82  Thompson’s 
principal political rival, Democratic Attorney General Jim Doyle, then 
picked up the “truth in sentencing” call and was first out of the blocks 
with a specific reform proposal in 1996.83  Doyle’s proposal, however, 
followed the lead of most TIS jurisdictions in maintaining some 
indeterminacy; the Attorney General would have permitted inmates to 
earn GCT and thereby obtain release as early as the eighty-five percent 
mark of their sentences.84 
Although Doyle’s GCT proposal was far less generous than the pre-
1984 system, which permitted day-for-day credits for longer-serving 
inmates,85 it became a target of ridicule from the Thompson camp.  
Releasing prisoners after they serve just eighty-five percent of their 
sentences, sniffed Thompson’s spokesman, is not truth in sentencing.86   
The Doyle-Thompson rivalry, the partisan backlash against the 
supposed softness and mismanagement of the ISP and parole, and a 
sharp rightward tilt in the Legislature in the 1990s87 may have made 
 
78.  Mike Flaherty, Truth in Sentencing: End of Parole Could Jam Prisons, Boost 
Budget, WIS. ST. J., Apr. 12, 1998, at 1A, available at 1998 WLNR 5462617. 
79.  See, e.g., John Welsh, Longer Sentences, Shorter Terms; Average Prison Stay in 
Wisconsin Has Been Decreasing, State Journal Analysis Finds, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 15, 1998, at 
1A, available at 1998 WLNR 5478707 (noting that Parole Chair was called “most dangerous 
man in Wisconsin” by Kenosha County District Attorney). 
80.  The Parole Chairperson in a gubernatorial appointee.  WIS. STAT. § 15.145(1) 
(2011–2012). 
81.  See Tonry, supra note 55, at 150. 
82.  JOE FONTAINE, WIS. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING POLICY IN WISCONSIN: 
1975–2005, at 24 (2005). 
83.  Id. at 25. 
84.  O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 10). 
85.  Id. 
86.  Doyle Urges Halt to Early Releases; Report Shows Felons Are Serving Shorter 
Sentences Than Six Years Ago, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 15, 1996, at 3B, available at 1996 WLNR 
4488619. 
87.  Democrats controlled both legislative chambers in the 1980s, but Republicans took 
the Senate in 1993 and the Assembly in 1995.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, 
2011–2012 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 256 (2011). 
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inevitable that the final version of TIS, adopted in 1998,88 would be 
harsher and more rigid than either Doyle or Thompson had initially 
proposed.  In contrast to Thompson’s initial campaign promise, the final 
TIS law was not limited to violent criminals.89  And, in contrast to 
Doyle’s proposal, the final law made no allowance for good conduct 
time.90  Moreover, the law also included a fifty percent, across-the-board 
increase in maximum sentences.91 
The arguments for TIS advanced by Doyle, Thompson, and other 
proponents sounded three distinct themes.  First, proponents argued 
that TIS would reduce crime by giving prison sentences a stronger 
deterrent force and by incapacitating dangerous offenders for longer 
periods of time.92  Second, proponents argued that TIS advanced 
democratic values by shifting power over punishment from the 
unelected members of the Parole Commission to the state’s elected 
judiciary.93  Finally, proponents also framed TIS as a victims’ rights 
measure; it was said that victims would benefit from having greater 
certainty as to the release dates of their offenders.94 
The first argument simply perpetuated the Right’s longstanding 
critique of parole as too lenient.  The second two in some respects 
echoed the Left’s process-oriented critique of parole in the 1970s, but 
with a focus on the interests of victims and voters, rather than on those 
of offenders.  Missing from the public discussion seemed to be any of the 
humanitarian, reintegrationist sensibilities that had propelled the 
creation of the indeterminate system in the nineteenth century. 
In any event, when the TIS law took effect in 1999,95 Wisconsin 
abruptly moved from a system of moderate indeterminacy to one of 
hyper-determinacy.  A state fiscal crisis shortly thereafter and related 
 
88.  Act of June 15, 1998, 1997 Wis. Act 283, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 2096. 
89.  O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 11). 
90.  Id.  
91.  Id.  
92.  Id. (manuscript at 14). 
93.  Id. (manuscript at 12–13). 
94.  For instance, a leading supporter in the Senate argued, “Our current system of 
penalizing and imprisoning people is a fraud perpetrated on the victims . . . .  We’ve probably 
all heard . . . the stories from district attorneys that tell us there’s no way they can tell a victim 
how long somebody will be behind bars . . . .”  Richard P. Jones, Senate Easily Passes Bill to 
End Parole: It Would Take Effect in ‘99, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 2, 1998, at 1A, 
available at 1998 WLNR 5756084 (quoting Senator Joanne Huelsman) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
95.  Act of June 15, 1998, 1997 Wis. Act 283, § 456, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 2096, 2412–43. 
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concerns over the DOC’s burgeoning budget helped to motivate some 
softening of the new regime in 2002.96  However, the system’s hyper-
determinacy remained largely intact.  Although the 2002 law created 
new opportunities for judges to modify sentences,97 there was no reason 
to think that this would become a routine feature of penal practice, as 
parole and good conduct time had once been.  Indeed, one study found 
an almost laughably low success rate of 0.8% for sentence modification 
petitions in three of the state’s largest counties (Milwaukee, Racine, and 
Kenosha).98 
D.  Moderate Determinacy, 2009–2011 
Although more extreme than in other states, Wisconsin’s turn to 
hyper-determinacy was part of a broader national trend in the 1990s.  
Indeed, one study determined that forty-two states had TIS laws in place 
by the end of the decade.99  As with the earlier wave of parole reforms in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the new TIS laws reflected continuing public 
frustration with historically high rates of violent crime, a loss of 
confidence in the effectiveness of rehabilitative programming, and a 
mistrust of criminal justice professionals100 (albeit without much of the 
due-process and equal-protection orientation of the first wave). 
As the 1990s gave way to the 2000s, the national pendulum seemed 
to swing back in the opposite direction.  In part, this resulted from state 
fiscal crises associated with the recessions of 2001 and 2007–2009, which 
forced many states to consider whether they could really afford all of the 
 
96.  O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 16–18). 
97.  See Norris, supra note 14, at 1566, 1613. 
98.  Id. at 1583 n.149. 
99.  SABOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 7. 
100.  See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, 
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 159–
60, 173–74 (2001) (discussing impact of chronic fear of crime and politics of mistrust of 
government on penal policies in the 1990s).  This is not to say that, in adopting TIS, American 
policymakers simply followed public preferences in a straightforward, unproblematic way.  
For instance, much research establishes that political and media elites play an important role 
in fanning public fear of crime.  MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND 
SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 37 (2004).  Additionally, political and media 
elites can also define the range of policy responses that are on the table for public discussion.  
There is no reason, for example, to think that Wisconsin adopted the nation’s most extreme 
TIS law because Wisconsin voters had uniquely strong views about TIS.  Rather, hyper-
determinacy resulted from a series of calculated decisions made by Wisconsin’s political elites 
that were not made by the political elites in other states. 
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tough-on-crime measures that had been adopted in the 1990s.101  In part, 
the determinacy pendulum reversed course because the rehabilitation 
pendulum also reversed course: the “nothing works” mantra of the 
1970s and 1980s was replaced with a new hope that more rigorously 
“evidence-based” approaches would yield significant reductions in 
recidivism rates.102  Increased confidence in rehabilitation, in turn, 
promotes increased acceptance of flexible penal systems that are 
designed to encourage and reward rehabilitative progress—much as 
happened in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Finally, 
with crime rates going through a period of sustained decline,103 public 
concern over crime and general punitiveness also dropped.104  Consistent 
with these changes, national opinion surveys began to reveal high levels 
of public support for alternatives to incarceration.105  Little wonder, 
then, that a good three-dozen states adopted new early release 
opportunities for prisoners between 2000 and 2010.106 
Wisconsin came late to the party.  Finally, in 2009, the state adopted 
significant changes to its system of hyper-determinacy.  Jim Doyle, now 
serving as Governor, pushed through the Democratic Legislature a 
complicated set of reforms that, in a sense, recreated parole and good 
conduct time with new names.107  Some of the important features 
included: (1) creation of new opportunities for early release based on 
good behavior in prison (“positive adjustment time”), amounting to as 
much as one-third off the prison term;108 (2) transfer of authority over 
sentence-adjustment from the judiciary to a new Earned Release 
Review Commission (ERRC);109 (3) expansion of “compassionate 
release,” which permitted release by the ERRC for inmates based on 
 
101.  See, e.g., Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is the Budget Crisis Changing 
the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration?, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 41 (2002). 
102.  Roger K. Warren, The Most Promising Way Forward: Incorporating Evidence-
Based Practice into State Sentencing and Corrections Policies, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 322, 322 
(2008). 
103.  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE, at v (2007). 
104.  PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT’L FOR THE NAT’L CTR FOR STATE 
COURTS, THE NSCS SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 13 
(2006); Mark D. Ramirez, Punitive Sentiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 337 (2013). 
105.  O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 35–39). 
106.  Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate 
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2011). 
107.  O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 18–20). 
108.  Norris, supra note 14, at 1574–75. 
109.  Id. at 1572–74. 
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terminal illness or other qualifying medical conditions;110 and (4) 
authority for the DOC to release certain inmates who were within one 
year of their original release dates.111  Public defenses of these reforms 
focused on their capacity to save corrections costs and on the need to 
provide better incentives for good behavior and rehabilitative effort.112 
Although these changes moved Wisconsin away from hyper-
determinacy, they fell far short of a return to the moderate 
indeterminacy of 1984–1999, and are probably better characterized as a 
new regime of moderate determinacy.  In the pre-TIS system (moderate 
indeterminacy), nearly all inmates qualified for release at the one-
quarter mark of the sentence; in comparison to the mandatory release 
date (two-thirds), this meant that inmates through good behavior and 
generous treatment by the Parole Commission might knock off more 
than sixty percent of the maximum time of imprisonment.113  By 
contrast, the Doyle reforms seemed designed to reduce the period of 
initial confinement by at most only about one-third—this was the 
maximum benefit that could be earned through positive adjustment 
time.  Moreover, even this one-third reduction was limited to just the 
least serious offenders (those convicted of nonviolent misdemeanors 
and Class F through I felonies); more serious offenders qualified for 
smaller reductions of twenty-five or fifteen percent, or none at all.114  
Other aspects of the Doyle reforms were even more limited.  For 
instance, the ERRC could only provide sentence adjustment after 
seventy-five or eighty-five percent of the prison term had been served, 
depending on the seriousness of the offense.115 
Republicans nonetheless wasted no time in castigating Doyle’s 
proposal as a “complete gutting of truth in sentencing.”116  Echoing the 
 
110.  Id. at 1568–70. 
111.  Id. at 1576. 
112.  See, e.g., Steven Elbow, Doyle’s Vetoes Rankle Friends and Foes: Both Sides of the 
Aisle Irked as Governor Strips Budget of Key Prison Release Terms, CAP. TIMES, July 8, 2009, 
at 17, available at 2009 WLNR 13042629 (“Doyle’s earned release plan was presented last 
spring as a way to chip away at a burgeoning prison population . . . .”); Mark Pitsch, Prisoner 
Proposal Defended: Critic Says Plan Guts Sentence Law, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A1, 
available at 2009 WLNR 3327502 (“The proposal, unveiled Tuesday as part of the state’s 
2009–11 budget, could save millions of dollars while also providing rehabilitation incentives to 
prisoners, Corrections Secretary Rick Raemisch said.”). 
113.  O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 8); see also Norris, supra note 
14, at 1574 
114.  Norris, supra note 14, at 1574. 
115.  Id. at 1573–74. 
116.  Pitsch, supra note 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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original arguments for TIS, opponents of Doyle’s plan invoked both 
public-safety and democratic-accountability considerations.  “We’re not 
talking about Boy Scouts here,” said one Republican leader, “We’re 
talking about some dangerous people that are going to be released.”117  
Another observed, “With judges you have accountability . . . .  Judges 
are elected and they’re re-elected by the people.  The nameless faceless 
bureaucrats on this [ERRC] will be able to release whoever they want 
with no accountability.”118 
In 2009, Republicans could do little but complain.  In 2010, however, 
they swept to power in Madison, led by a new Governor, Scott 
Walker.119  Since Walker expressly campaigned against the Doyle 
reforms in his run for office,120 there should be little surprise that the 
reforms were repealed in 2011.121  Supporters of the repeal bill reiterated 
the same sorts of criticisms of early release that they had advanced in 
2009.  For instance, one leading Republican charged, “Early release has 
allowed hundreds of high-risk inmates to get out of jail before serving 
their time . . . and Wisconsin will undoubtedly be a safer place to live, 
work and raise a family now that dangerous criminals will be kept 
behind bars where they belong.”122  To such criticisms, though, was 
added the charge that the Doyle reforms had not even proven much of a 
money saver.123  In their first year, for instance, only 158 inmates were 
released early, which fell far short of the 500 to 1,000 projected by 
Doyle.124  If there was some irony in attacking early release as both too 
reckless and too conservative, that irony was apparently lost on 
Republicans, who effectively reinstated the system of hyper-
determinacy that prevailed from 1999 to 2009. 
 
117.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
118.  Id. 
119.  Norris, supra note 14, at 1567. 
120.  Id. 
121.  See WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ACT MEMO: 2011 WIS. ACT 38, REPEAL OF 
EARLY RELEASE (2011), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/act/2011/act038
-sb057.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XQU3-TGAP.  
122.  Liam Marlaire, Walker Signs Bill Ending Early Release Program, LEADER-
TELEGRAM, July 20, 2011, http://www.leadertelegram.com/news/front_page/article_28a54483-
63d1-5197-ad70-6f255a35fa8d.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S4YB-3DH6 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
123.  Id. 
124.  Ben Poston, Sentencing Reform Results Fall Short: Early Prison Releases, Cost 
Saving Are a Fraction of Year-Ago Estimate, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 10, 2010, at 1A, 
available at 2010 WLNR 13920379. 
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E. Hyper-Determinacy:  Destination or Detour?  
One question raised by the foregoing history is whether Wisconsin is 
on a policy trajectory that will always lead back to hyper-determinacy.  
Put differently, do the rejections of moderate indeterminacy in 1998 and 
of moderate determinacy in 2011 demonstrate that any meaningful 
degree of indeterminacy is a political non-starter in Wisconsin? 
For at least four reasons, I do not think the history supports such a 
conclusion.  First, taking the long view, Wisconsin has had parole and 
good conduct time for the vast majority of its existence as a state.  From 
the wider historical perspective, hyper-determinacy remains little more 
than a short-term experiment; its lifespan has still been no longer than 
that of the moderate indeterminacy system set up in 1984.  The 
extraordinary dynamism—the constant churning of new waves of 
reform—that has marked sentencing and corrections policy nationally125 
and in Wisconsin126 since 1970 should make us very hesitant to view any 
given aspect of current policy as set in stone.  Such hesitancy should be 
especially strong as to aspects of policy that cut against penal practices 
that, until relatively recently, were accepted by Wisconsinites with little 
apparent controversy.  
Second, the history demonstrates that Wisconsin normally remains 
within the national mainstream of sentencing and corrections policy.  
Wisconsin adopted good conduct time and parole in the nineteenth 
century at about the same time that most other states did so.  Similarly, 
a century later, Wisconsin imposed new constraints on indeterminacy in 
the same era that many other states were also taking action to bring 
more uniformity and due process to their sentencing and corrections 
systems.  Then, when Wisconsin adopted its TIS law in 1998, it was 
riding a wave that rolled over more than forty other states (albeit with 
less extreme results).  Likewise, when Wisconsin adopted its 2009 early 
release reforms, it was taking part in a widespread national trend.  The 
2011 repeal put Wisconsin back in an outlier position, but the state’s 
general tendency to move in sync with national trends in this area 
suggests that the current regime will not likely last indefinitely.  Many 
other states are reaping significant financial gains from softening the 
harsh penal systems that were developed in the 1990s, and are doing so 
 
125.  Tonry, supra note 55. 
126.  See, e.g., O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 5–21) (describing 
waves of reform in Wisconsin since 1990). 
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without any apparent adverse effect on crime rates.127  There is nothing 
in Wisconsin’s history to suggest that it will prove an obstinate holdout 
against reforms that are generally embraced elsewhere. 
Third, in retrospect, it is easy to see that the adoption of hyper-
determinacy in 1998 resulted less from a sudden recognition of certain 
timeless principles of justice or a playing out of the inherent logic of 
crime control, than from the confluence of various circumstances that 
were specific to the mid- and late 1990s, or perhaps somewhat more 
broadly to the latter portion of the twentieth century—circumstances 
that are no longer present, or at least not to the same degree.  As 
indicated in Figure 1, rates of violent crime in the state have stabilized 
or dropped since the long period of nearly constant increases between 
the mid-1960s and mid-1990s.  As indicated in Figure 2, rates of 
imprisonment have stabilized or dropped since the long period of nearly 
constant increases between the mid-1970s and the mid-2000s.  These 
increases threatened to overwhelm Governor Thompson’s DOC, and as 
the agency struggled to cope, Democrats tried to use its difficulties for 
partisan political advantage—a strategy that exacerbated the 
politicization of sentencing policy in the 1990s and sharpened the 
partisan competition over who could be toughest on crime.  At the same 
time, confidence in rehabilitation may have been at a singularly low ebb 
in the 1990s; the past decade, by contrast, has witnessed a proliferation 
of drug courts and other treatment-oriented initiatives in Wisconsin, 
many of which have been funded by the state’s growing Treatment 
Alternatives Diversion grant program.128 
Fourth, and finally, although current conditions are much closer to 
those of 2011 than to those of 1998, there are also good reasons to doubt 
that the repeal of the Doyle reforms in 2011 represented some sort of 
definitive repudiation of indeterminacy.  Repeal swiftly followed the 
election of Governor Scott Walker and new Republican legislative 
majorities in 2010—electoral results that probably had much less to do 
with criminal justice policies than with a broader national backlash 
 
127.  See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., LESSONS FROM THE 
STATES: REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND CURBING CORRECTIONS COSTS THROUGH JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT (2013), available at http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FI
NAL_State_Lessons_mbedit.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H3AK-LXVC. 
128.  See UNIV. OF WIS. POPULATION HEALTH INST., TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES 
AND DIVERSION (TAD) PROGRAM: PARTICIPANT OUTCOME EVALUATION AND COST-
BENEFIT REPORT (2007−2013), at 1 (2014), available at https://uwphi.pophealth.wisc.edu/abo
ut/staff/van-stelle-kit/tad-2014-outcomes-report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J6JR-479H. 
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against President Obama and his health-care reforms, as well as 
unhappiness with a chronically sluggish economy.129  Indeed, it is hard to 
see the repeal as anything but the byproduct of an extraordinary and 
perhaps unprecedented surge in partisanship in Madison in the 2009–
2011 time period.130  A Democratic Governor pushed reforms through a 
Democratic Legislature; then, when Republicans took control of state 
government, they promptly pushed through a repeal of the same 
reforms before they had been in place long enough to prove themselves.  
This smacks more of knee-jerk partisanship than reasoned policy choice, 
especially in light of the seemingly inconsistent criticisms that the 
reforms were both too conservative and too reckless.131  Certainly, the 
survey data discussed in Part IV below belie any suggestion that 
Wisconsin voters share the inflexible stance on TIS that was embodied 
in the repeal. 
III. THE DUBIOUS CASE FOR HYPER-DETERMINACY 
As indicated in Part II, there have been essentially three arguments 
advanced for hyper-determinacy in Wisconsin.  Each of the three has 
some force, but they do not persuasively dictate such an extreme policy 
as Wisconsin has.  Each is considered in more detail below.  For present 
purposes, I am particularly interested in exploring the extent to which 
good conduct time may be reconciled with the basic normative values 
that underwrite hyper-determinacy. 
A. Democratic Accountability 
Sentencing judges in Wisconsin are elected, while members of the 
Parole Commission and Earned Release Review Commission have not 
been.132  This difference in democratic accountability has led to 
arguments that judges are more appropriate decision makers when it 
 
129.  See, e.g., Craig Gilbert, River of Red Buries the Blue, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/106589258.html, archived at http://per
ma.cc/7REN-DGNY (noting that the economy was “overwhelmingly the top concern” of 
Wisconsin voters in 2010 and that “Republican[s] made gains across the board” in Midwest).  
130.  See, e.g., James B. Kelleher, Up to 100,000 Protest Wisconsin Law Curbing Unions, 
REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/13/us-wisconsin-
protests-idUSTRE72B2AN20110313, archived at http://perma.cc/4SQM-B6CS (describing 
flight of Democrat senators to Illinois). 
131.  See supra Part II.D. 
132.  See Act of June 29, 2009, 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 34, 2009 Wis. Sess. Laws 179, 185. 
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comes to punishment than appointed commissioners.133  There may 
indeed be some symbolic and practical value to giving locally elected 
judges some say over punishment, which promotes the perception, and 
perhaps also to some extent the reality, that punishment is grounded in 
the particular needs and values of the community most directly harmed 
by the offense.134  Even granting this value, however, the democratic 
accountability argument does not provide strong support for hyper-
determinacy.  The argument suffers from at least four flaws. 
First, the argument exaggerates the differences in the democratic 
accountability of judges and commissioners.  On the one hand, local 
judicial elections have notoriously low turnouts and offer little useful 
information to aid voters’ decisions.135  As to sentencing specifically, a 
few cases in a judge’s career may generate substantial media coverage, 
but the vast majority of a judge’s sentencing decisions fly well below the 
public’s radar screen.  Democratic accountability for these decisions is 
far more theoretical than actual.  On the other hand, while appointed 
commissioners may not face elections themselves, they are accountable 
to Governors, who are much more likely to experience a closely 
contested, closely covered, high-turnout race than is a trial-court judge.  
While the democratic accountability of commissioners may be indirect, 
it is real, and it sometimes affects practice in important ways.  For 
instance, after the high rate of parole grants in Wisconsin became a 
matter of public controversy in the 1990s, the grant rate dropped 
 
133.  See, e.g., James E. Doyle, Wisconsin Needs “Truth in Sentencing,” 20 WIS. BAR 
CRIM. L. NEWS 17, 18 (1997); Pitsch, supra note 112. 
134.  I develop an argument along these lines in Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review 
of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123, 2152–55 (2010). 
135.  See, e.g., Diane S. Sykes, The State of Judicial Selection in Wisconsin, MARQ. LAW., 
Spring 2009, at 64, 69 (“Judicial campaigns in Wisconsin have historically suffered from a 
different sort of problem: Most were low-interest affairs in which the candidates had 
relatively modest budgets and limited opportunities to communicate with voters about their 
qualifications, experience, and judicial philosophy.  The media paid little attention. . . .  It 
could reasonably be argued that these old-style judicial elections provided so little 
information to the voting public as to make judicial elections nothing more than meaningless 
contests about name recognition.”).  Although elections for the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
have become much better-financed in recent years, id., local judicial elections remain quiet 
affairs.  For instance, in 2012, Milwaukee County elected ten Circuit Court judges, eight of 
whom ran unopposed.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, 2013–2014 WISCONSIN 
BLUE BOOK 877 (2013).  The highest vote total for any of the twelve candidates was less than 
85,000.  Id.  By contrast, later in 2012, President Barack Obama won more than 332,000 votes 
in Milwaukee County.  Id. at 920.  Even Republican candidate Mitt Romney, who lost badly 
in Milwaukee County, received almost twice as many votes as the biggest judicial winner.  Id.  
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precipitously.136  To be sure, parole boards more commonly go about 
their business without much media scrutiny, but that is no different than 
the experience of the average trial-court judge. 
Second, the local accountability of judges is a two-edged sword.  
While local communities undoubtedly have a legitimate interest in the 
way that crime is punished, so, too, does the state as a whole.  After all, 
it is the state that promulgates the criminal code, the state in whose 
name a prosecution is conducted, and the state that will implement (and 
pay for) the sentence that is handed down.  The state may quite 
appropriately wish to avoid wide county-to-county disparities in 
sentences imposed for the same crime and also to ensure that limited 
state correctional resources, particularly prison beds, are put to their 
best crime-reducing use.  Locally accountable judges, however, have 
little incentive to prioritize such legitimate statewide interests.  Indeed, 
there is even something of a free-rider problem in the disjunction 
between who imposes and who pays for a prison sentence: to local 
judges, state prisons are essentially a free resource, and, as with any free 
resource, we can expect this one to be over utilized.137 
Third, while some democratic accountability is properly viewed as 
an important source of legitimacy in our American governmental 
system, such accountability is not an absolute value that trumps all else 
in all situations.  The fact that an official decision maker faces the voters 
from time to time may be sufficient to give some legitimacy to that 
official’s decisions, but it is not necessary.  Rather, our governmental 
system is premised on checks and balances involving diverse official 
actors whose legitimacy is grounded in different ways.  Federal judges, 
for instance, get their legitimacy not from direct democratic 
accountability, but from the appointment and confirmation process and 
from observance of the procedural and jurisprudential principles that 
give judicial decision making its distinctive character.  Likewise, the 
heads of executive agencies do not, in general, face the voters 
themselves, but gain legitimacy by virtue of their accountability to 
 
136.  See WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL PAPER #55: ADULT 
CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 6 (2001) (noting that 75% of male first releases from prison were 
to discretionary parole in 1997–1998, but only 33.5% in 1999–2000). 
137.  In theory, appellate review might help to ensure that locally elected sentencing 
judges attend to statewide interests, but in practice appellate courts across the country have 
almost uniformly resisted such a role.  O’Hear, supra note 134, at 2125.  Wisconsin is no 
exception.  Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning From 
the Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 762–76 (2009). 
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elected chief executives and legislators, their observance of due process, 
and their subject-matter expertise.   
Indeed, to claim that punishment should be exclusively in the hands 
of democratically accountable officials proves far too much.  This would 
require, for instance, that the Secretary of Corrections and all of his 
prison wardens should also be elected, for the myriad decisions they 
make about the quality of the prisoner’s experience—in what institution 
is the prisoner housed, how the prisoner is disciplined for rules 
infractions, how much contact the prisoner is allowed with family 
members, what rehabilitative programming and employment 
opportunities are made available, how much protection is provided from 
sexual abuse, and so forth—seem no less consequential than decisions 
about the quantity of time served.  Once it is conceded that appointed 
officials may properly make some of the state’s most important 
decisions relating to punishment, there is no obvious reason why they 
should be categorically excluded from the one particular decision of 
release date.  Rather, it seems more natural to think that this decision, 
like so many others in our governmental system, should be subject to 
checks and balances involving multiple decision makers, each with their 
own strengths and weaknesses. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the present context, 
however strong one’s doubts that a parole commission can be reconciled 
with basic democratic values, such doubts have little relevance to good 
conduct time.  As structured in Wisconsin before 1984 and in my 
proposal in this Essay, good conduct time simply does not involve the 
same sort of exercise of official discretion that has been associated with 
parole.  Rather, GCT credits are awarded in an automatic, formulaic 
way based on the relatively objective facts of a prisoner’s good conduct.  
The formula is dictated by the democratically accountable legislature.  
Although underlying disciplinary decisions may embody some exercise 
of official discretion, the effect of these disciplinary decisions on an 
inmate’s release date is much less direct and consequential than a parole 
commission’s exercise of its plenary power over release. 
In sum, democratic values do not clearly preclude even a traditional 
parole commission, and much less do they rule out a system of good 
conduct time. 
B. Victim Rights 
It is easy to see why some victims might object to indeterminacy.  
Some may feel it important to their recovery for the legal system to 
provide immediate, clear, definitive answers to their questions about 
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what exactly will be done to their victimizers.  Some may feel that any 
lenience shown to an offender symbolically devalues the wrongfulness 
of the offense and their experience of victimization.  Some may wish to 
take precautions before their victimizer is released and find it 
inconvenient—or even terrifying in some cases—not to know well in 
advance when the release will occur.  Some risk serious trauma through 
an unexpected encounter with their offender on the outside. 
These are all very legitimate concerns and should be taken seriously 
by policymakers.138  Indeed, in light of these concerns, I would not favor 
a return to a general system of hyper-indeterminacy. 
Yet, there remain at least three reasons not to go to the opposite 
extreme of hyper-determinacy in all cases.  First, and most 
fundamentally, the criminal-justice system primarily exists to serve 
public interests, not the preferences of private victims.  Publicly 
accountable prosecutors may decide whether and how to charge and 
plea-bargain cases independently of victim preferences.  Judges may 
receive victim impact statements at sentencing, but are not bound by the 
victim’s penal recommendations.139  The system can and should try to 
support victim recovery, but this has never been thought a singular, 
overriding objective to the detriment of all other public interests.   
Second, while many victims undoubtedly wish to maximize 
determinacy, this is not the situation facing all, and perhaps not even 
most, of the offenders sent to prison.  For instance, in Wisconsin, more 
than fifty-seven percent of the men admitted to prison in 2011 and 2012 
were sent there for one of the following reasons: operating while 
intoxicated, drug offenses, bail jumping/escape, or otherwise violating 
conditions of community supervision.140  In such cases, it is often not 
 
138.  Survey results confirm that Wisconsin voters care about victim interests.  In a July 
2014 poll of registered voters in the state, more than eighty-one percent said that it was “very 
important” or “absolutely essential” for the criminal justice system to keep victims informed 
about their cases and help them to understand how the system works.  MARQ. UNIV. LAW 
SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL—JULY 17–20, 2014, at Q28b (2014) 
[hereinafter 2014 TOPLINES], available at http://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2
014/07/MLSP22Toplines.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QMV6-FCAK. 
139.  See WIS. STAT. § 972.14(3)(a) (2011–2012). 
140.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL PAPER 56: ADULT 
CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 41 (2013).  Note that my figure includes those in the “unsentenced” 
category, which “generally includes admissions to the prison system of individuals who are 
alleged to have violated their probation, parole, or extended supervision, and offenders 
serving time in prison as an alternative to the revocation of probation, parole, or extended 
supervision.”  Id. at 10. 
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clear that there is any particular victim who has interests distinct from 
those of the general public.  Moreover, even in cases that do have 
discrete, identifiable victims, it is important to remember that victim 
experiences and preferences are far from monolithic, and may evolve 
over time.  Many property offenses, of course, are impersonal in nature 
and involve corporate victims; here, concerns about emotional trauma 
and affronts to human dignity seem out of place.  Even individuals who 
have been personally victimized may have attitudes that are not wholly 
punitive;141 for instance, some may hope above all else that something 
positive will come out of the terrible thing that has happened to them 
and be quite open to indeterminate dispositions that support offender 
rehabilitation and eventual reintegration into the community.  In any 
event, in light of the great diversity of victim experiences and 
preferences, it would be a mistake in the name of victims to adopt a 
uniform rule of hyper-determinacy for all cases.  Governor Thompson’s 
original proposal that TIS be limited to cases of violent crime142 seems 
much closer to the mark, although even that may have been an unduly 
rigid approach. 
Third, and finally, the sorts of victim interests that are said to 
support determinacy may be accommodated reasonably well within a 
system of limited good conduct time.  While we may easily appreciate 
the consternation of the victim who is told, “Your offender may be 
released at any time in the next twelve years,” it seems a very different 
matter to say, “You may be confident that your offender will spend the 
next eight years behind bars and possibly even an additional four 
beyond that.”  Concerns may be further mitigated if each interested 
victim is provided with periodic updates regarding his offender’s accrual 
or loss of good conduct time and current projected release date.143  This 
 
141.  See, e.g., Mark S. Umbreit, Betty Vos, Robert B. Coates & Elizabeth Lightfoot, 
Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and 
Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 271 (2005) (noting diversity of reasons given by victims for 
participating in victim-offender mediation, including “to help the offender change behavior”). 
142.  See supra Part II.C. 
143.  The DOC already makes release date information available through its public 
website.  General Public-Offender Search, WIS. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS, http://offender
.doc.state.wi.us/lop/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7MUM-CQ3Y.  
The DOC also provides notification to registered victims of changes in inmate status through 
its VOICE for Victims program.  Notification Services, WIS. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, 
http://doc.wi.gov/victim-resources/notification-services (last visited Nov. 8, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/552A-BWPV.  There seems no reason that good conduct time information 
could not be added to these services. 
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kind of system would provide victims with ample opportunity to prepare 
for release.  It would also diminish the sense of an offense-denigrating 
“early” release.  Rather than an after-the-fact exercise in lenience, the 
operation of good conduct time can and should be viewed as an integral 
part of the sentence, with its purpose and parameters clearly laid out by 
the judge in open court.144  If this were accomplished, any arguments 
against GCT based on victim rights would lose most or all of their force. 
C. Public Safety 
Proponents of hyper-determinacy in Wisconsin have a curiously 
equivocal stance when it comes to public safety.  On the one hand, they 
have not hesitated to play on public fears of violent predators.  For 
instance, when notorious child-killer Gerald Turner was paroled in the 
late 1990s, Governor Thompson declared that this was “the best 
example yet of why Wisconsin needs the truth in sentencing initiative 
[he] proposed.”145  Similarly, critics of Governor Doyle asserted that his 
2009 reforms allowed “hundreds of high-risk inmates to get out of 
jail.”146  Yet, at other times, prominent TIS proponents like Scott 
Walker have asserted, “Truth-in-sentencing wasn’t necessarily to make 
sentences longer, it was to make them certain.”147  As a result of 
concerns about the potential budgetary impact of TIS, proponents most 
heavily emphasized the process values of democratic accountability and 
finality for victims, and often downplayed claims of enhanced severity.148  
Proponents liked to hold out the hope that judges would correct for the 
loss of parole by proportionately reducing the length of their imposed 
sentences.149  But, of course, if this happened, then the Gerald Turners 
 
144.  I have suggested some specific language judges might use in O’Hear, supra note 1, 
at 225–26. 
145.  David Callender, Gov Talks Tough on Sentencing, CAP. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at 
1A, available at 1998 WLNR 2463935. 
146.  Marlaire, supra note 122. 
147.  Sarah Wyatt, Lawmakers at Odds Over Prison Time: Budget Bills Differ on Truth 
in Sentencing, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 7, 2002, at 2B, available at 2002 WLNR 
3626291 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148.  See, e.g., Matt Pommer, Huge Savings Claimed for “Truth in Sentencing,” but 
Prison Expert Dickey Calls Numbers “Fiction,” CAP. TIMES, June 4, 1997, at 4A, available at 
1997 WLNR 2411960 (quoting Scott Walker as saying, “While it’s still very debatable whether 
truth in sentencing will require any additional money, how can you put a price tag on peace of 
mind for victims and their families?  It’s invaluable . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
149.  See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 78 (“Assembly Speaker Scott Jensen, R-Waukesha, 
said costs shouldn’t rise too much because judges will adjust their sentences to match the 
amount of time they believe criminals should actually serve in prison.”). 
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of the world would not spend one extra day in prison under the new 
regime. 
In truth, there is no necessary relationship between determinacy and 
severity, and hence no necessary relationship between determinacy and 
public safety.  There is nothing to stop judges from increasing or 
decreasing their imposed sentences as determinacy is increased or 
decreased so as to maintain a more-or-less constant level of 
incapacitation for high-risk offenders, especially if indeterminacy 
functions transparently within a relatively narrow range at the end of 
the prison term.150   
There are two potential wrinkles with the introduction of a new 
good conduct time system, as I propose.  First, if GCT is made available 
to already-sentenced inmates, then the sentence cannot take account of 
the possible credits.  In light of this concern, as well as a deference to the 
reasonable expectations of victims, the retroactivity of any new GCT 
system should be strictly limited. 
A second wrinkle is this: while judges could offset the anticipated 
effect of GCT in most cases, they would not be able to do so in those 
cases in which they would like the defendant to serve a maximum or 
near-maximum prison term.  Consider, for instance, an armed robber 
with a long history of prior convictions.  A judge might think that such a 
defendant represents such a grave threat to public safety that he should 
be incapacitated for as long as possible.  The statutory maximum period 
of initial confinement for armed robbery, a Class C felony,151 is twenty-
five years.152  However, with the introduction of good conduct time, a 
judge could no longer guarantee that the defendant would actually serve 
twenty-five years before release; with maximum good conduct time, in 
fact, the defendant might get out in sixteen years and eight months (that 
is, two-thirds of twenty-five years). 
This limitation should not be seen as a significant threat to public 
safety.  First, even with a potential one-third reduction, maximum 
sentences in Wisconsin remain very high by any reasonable standard.  
Indeed, in many cases these maximums still reflect the impact of the 
 
150.  See, e.g., Kevin A. Wright & Jeffrey W. Rosky, Too Early Is Too Soon: Lessons 
from the Montana Department of Corrections Early Release Program, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 881, 888 (2011) (noting that some Montana judges changed their sentencing 
practices so as to make offenders ineligible for controversial early release program). 
151.  WIS. STAT. § 943.32(2) (2011–2012). 
152.  Id. § 973.01(2)(b)(3). 
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across-the-board increases of 1998.153  Consider again the example of 
more than sixteen years in prison for armed robbery.  In most of the rest 
of the world, sentences of even ten years in prison are exceedingly 
rare.154  In Germany, fifteen years in prison is viewed as such a long time 
that even life-sentenced inmates must be considered for release at that 
point.155  Indeed, even in Wisconsin up to 1994, armed robbers were 
subject to mandatory release at thirteen years and four months.156  If 
anyone doubts that sixteen years in prison is likely to make a big 
difference in the public-safety threat posed by a robber, they should 
simply consider from their own life experiences the changes and 
maturation that occur in most people between the ages of twenty-one 
(the average age of sentenced armed robbers in Wisconsin157) and thirty-
seven.158 
Second, in high-risk cases, there is good likelihood that prison terms 
can be lengthened through the application of special sentence-
enhancement statutes or the use of consecutive sentences on multiple 
counts.  Indeed, the very consideration that would warrant a finding of 
high risk—that is, repeated criminality—means that recidivism-based 
enhancers are more likely to apply and that multiple counts are more 
 
153.  The Criminal Penalties Study Committee, which proposed the new penalty 
classification scheme that was enacted in the 2002 TIS reform law, adopted as a general rule 
that maximum initial terms of confinement should conform to mandatory release dates in the 
pre-TIS system.  CRIMINAL PENALTIES STUDY COMM., FINAL REPORT 21–22 (1999).  
However, the Committee recommended upward adjustments to this baseline for many 
crimes, including such important crimes as sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, and 
robbery.  Id. at 26–29. 
154.  See, e.g., Michel Tonry, Sentencing Reform in America, 1975–2025, at tbl.1.3 
(2013) (unpublished manuscript, copy on file with author) (showing that sentences greater 
than 120 months occur in no more than 1.1% of cases in seven western European nations). 
155.  Dirk van Zyl Smit, Outlawing Irreducible Life Sentences: Europe on the Brink?, 23 
FED. SENT’G REP. 39, 40 (2010). 
156.  See WIS. STAT. § 943.32(2) (1993–1994) (classifying armed robbery as Class B 
felony); Act of April 6, 1994, 1993 Wis. Act 194, § 9, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 919, 920 (raising 
maximum for Class B felony from twenty to forty years).  Under the old system of mandatory 
release, supra Part II.B, an armed robber receiving the pre-1994 maximum sentence of twenty 
years would have subject to mandatory release at the two-thirds mark of the sentence, or 
thirteen years and four months. 
157.  BRENDA R. MAYRACK, WIS. SENTENCING COMM’N, RACE & SENTENCING IN 
WISCONSIN: SENTENCE AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS FIVE CRIMINAL 
OFFENSE AREAS 24 (2007). 
158.  See, e.g., Catherine Lebel & Christian Beaulieu, Longitudinal Development of 
Human Brain Wiring Continues from Childhood Into Adulthood, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE 
10937, 10943 (2011) (discussing MRI evidence of continued brain development of young 
adults well into their twenties). 
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likely to be available.  Consider once again the armed robber.  If he has 
a prior felony conviction in the past five years, then his maximum term 
of imprisonment would increase by six years.159  If he has two prior 
convictions for armed robbery or any other “serious” felonies, then he 
would be subject to a life term.160  Moreover, if he has a prior felony 
conviction and carried a firearm in the present armed robbery, then he 
would be guilty of another felony (felon in possession) for which he 
would face the possibility of a consecutive sentence.161  Additional 
counts and consecutive sentences might also be available for multiple 
victims, for nonconsensual entry into a building in connection with the 
robbery, for sexual assault in connection with the robbery, for injury to a 
law enforcement officer in connection with the arrest, and in many other 
plausible circumstances.  Assuming that prosecutors make full use of the 
charging tools available to them in the most serious cases, it should be 
quite unusual for judges to be limited to a twenty-five-year sentence 
(less good conduct time) when they reasonably believe that something 
longer is required for public safety. 
Third, it is important to bear in mind that the one-third reduction in 
prison time is not automatic, but must be earned through good conduct.  
For many high-risk inmates, the same characteristics that would make 
them prone to criminality, e.g., impulse-control deficits, would also tend 
to make disciplinary infractions more likely behind bars, and hence lead 
to the denial or loss of GCT.162 
 
159.  WIS. STAT. § 939.62(1)–(2) (2011–2012). 
160.  Id. § 939.62(2m). 
161.  Id. § 941.29. 
162.  See Richard Tewksbury, David Patrick Connor & Andrew S. Denney, Disciplinary 
Infractions Behind Bars: An Exploration of Importation and Deprivation Theories, 39 CRIM. 
JUST. REV. 201, 202 (2014) (“Regardless of the violent or nonviolent nature of disciplinary 
infractions, inmates engaging in any type of institutional misconduct are more likely to return 
to a prison upon release.”).  There has been some debate in the literature over whether there 
is a relationship between a tendency to engage in serious criminal misconduct and a tendency 
to violate low-level prison rules that prohibit behavior that would be lawful outside of prison.  
SCOTT D. CAMP, GERALD G. GAES, NEAL P. LANGAN & WILLIAM G. SAYLOR, FED. 
BUREAU OF PRISONS, THE INFLUENCE OF PRISONS ON INMATE MISCONDUCT: A 
MULTILEVEL INVESTIGATION 5 (2003).  However, recent research has found similarities 
between inmates who commit serious infractions and inmates who commit low-level 
infractions.  Id.  Additionally, a recent meta-analysis of sixty-eight studies of “what works” in 
reducing violations of prison rules found that “programs that were most effective in reducing 
prison misconducts also generated lower recidivism rates . . . in the community . . . .”  Sheila 
A. French & Paul Gendreau, Reducing Prison Misconducts: What Works!, 33 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 185, 210 (2006).  The authors conclude that their analysis “reinforces the view that 
prison misconduct behavior is a reasonable proxy for antisocial behavior in the 
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Fourth, it is also important to bear in mind that release based on 
good conduct time will not be to complete liberty in the community, but 
to the period of “extended supervision” (ES) that must be served at the 
end of a prison term under TIS.163  ES may include many conditions set 
by the sentencing judge and the DOC,164 the violation of which could 
result in a swift return to custody.165 
Fifth, notwithstanding the operation of good conduct time, sexually 
violent offenders—probably the group of offenders who inspire the 
most intense public-safety concerns—would still be subject to indefinite 
civil commitment upon their “release” from prison.166  Indeed, the state 
has used this authority aggressively over the past two decades, with 
hundreds of offenders institutionalized as “sexually violent persons” and 
only seventy-five actually succeeding in ever obtaining discharge from 
inpatient commitment.167   
Sixth, as an additional safeguard, a new good-time program could 
include an override feature permitting the DOC to continue to hold 
inmates notwithstanding their good-time credits if there is some specific, 
persuasive reason to think that their good conduct in prison is not 
indicative of likely success in avoiding new offenses after release.  A 
determination to this effect might be based, for instance, on such 
considerations as a significant, unaddressed, crimogenic mental health 
issue, such as drug addiction; a failure to take advantage of work, 
education, and programming opportunities in prison; and the absence of 
a viable plan to obtain employment and housing after release.  Such an 
override feature should, of course, include appropriate procedural 
safeguards and place a burden of proof on the DOC. 
Seventh, and most fundamentally, the facile assumption that longer 
incarceration means greater public safety must be rejected.  As we’ve 
moved beyond the “nothing works” era of the late twentieth century,168 
 
community.”  Id.  In the same vein, a recent study of more than 16,000 released Minnesota 
prisoners found that institutional discipline was a statistically significant predictor of 
recidivism.  Grant Duwe & Valerie Clark, Blessed Be the Social Tie That Binds: The Effects of 
Prison Visitation on Offender Recidivism, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 271, 272, 285 (2013). 
163.  WIS. STAT. § 973.01(2) (2011–2012). 
164.  Id. § 302.113(7). 
165.  Id. § 302.113(8m)–(9). 
166.  See generally WIS. STAT. ch. 980 (2011-2012). 
167.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL PAPER 54: CIVIL 
COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS 16–17 (2013).  
168.  See, e.g., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC 
POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, 
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Americans have increasingly come to recognize that the qualitative 
dimensions of incarceration may be just as important as the quantitative 
when it comes to public safety.  In one recent survey, for instance, a full 
eighty-seven percent of respondents, including eighty-five percent of 
Republicans, agreed that “[i]t does not matter whether a non-violent 
offender is in prison for 18 or 24 or 30 months . . . .  What really matters 
is that the system does a better job of making sure that when an 
offender does get out, he is less likely to commit another crime.”169  A 
GCT program can support the rehabilitative mission of the prison 
system by giving prisoners more hope and more incentive to take 
advantage of positive opportunities behind bars;170 by promoting 
institutional security and order;171 and by facilitating the movement of 
low-risk inmates out of prison, which can alleviate dangerous and 
dispiriting overcrowding172 and save money that can then be reinvested 
in expanded and improved programming for offenders.  Indeed, across 
the country, many states are now discovering that they can reduce 
recidivism, and hence crime rates, through just such a “justice 
 
AND CRIME RATES 1 (2006) (“We find that if Washington successfully implements a 
moderate-to-aggressive portfolio of evidence-based options, a significant level of future 
prison construction can be avoided, taxpayers can save about two billion dollars, and crime 
rates can be reduced.”); French & Gendreau, supra note 162, at 189 (noting that empirical 
literature on “what works” has identified certain principles of correctional treatment that 
have produced “impressive reductions in recidivism”); Aaron Knapp, Shaving Off Time 
Served: Officials Say Program Allowing Early Release from Prison Getting Results, J. TIMES, 
Dec. 31, 2013, at A1 (noting lower recidivism rates of Wisconsin prisoners who have gone 
through state’s Earned Release Program than for eligible inmates who did not participate). 
169.  PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 
POLICY IN AMERICA 5 (2012) [hereinafter PEW 2012]. 
170.  See, e.g., LYNNE GOODSTEIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DETERMINATE 
SENTENCING AND THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS: A STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION AND 
IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORM IN THREE STATES—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 37 (1984) 
(noting increased program participation in Illinois prisons after implementation of new GCT 
program that required program participation for full credit); Nora V. Demleitner, Good 
Conduct Time: How Much and For Whom? The Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal 
Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 777, 788 (2009) (noting “dramatic[]” increase in number of 
inmates participating in federal drug abuse program after Congress changed law to permit a 
one-year credit for successful completion).  
171.  See French & Gendreau, supra note 162, at 207 (discussing findings of meta-
analyses that behavioral programs have proven effective in reducing prison misconducts); 
Beth M. Huebner, Administrative Determinants of Inmate Violence: A Multilevel Analysis, 31 
J. CRIM. JUST. 107, 109 (2003) (noting research showing that “inmates involved in educational 
and vocational programming or work are less likely to assault prison staff or inmates”). 
172.  Some empirical research has found a relationship between crowding and inmate 
misconduct.  CAMP ET AL., supra note 162, at 22. 
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reinvestment” strategy.173  With such experiences in mind, there is no 
reason to assume that a significant overall reduction in incarceration—
which may or may not actually result from the implementation of a 
good-time program174—would diminish public safety; indeed, just the 
opposite may occur.175 
IV. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INDETERMINACY  
AND GOOD CONDUCT TIME 
Surveys in both Wisconsin and the nation as a whole reveal that 
public attitudes toward sentencing are much less rigidly punitive than is 
sometimes supposed.  Indeed, large majorities reject hyper-determinacy 
and favor more flexible approaches to prisoner release.  In this Part, I 
first summarize the Wisconsin data and then discuss complementary 
national findings. 
A. Support for Indeterminacy in Wisconsin 
 The Marquette University Law School Poll has conducted regular 
telephone surveys of Wisconsin voters since 2012.176  The surveys of July 
2012, July 2013, and July 2014 focused particularly on sentencing-related 
issues and, as detailed below, produced remarkably consistent results.  
The margin of error in each of these surveys was less than plus or minus 
four percentage points.177 
 
173.  See generally COUNCIL FOR STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., supra note 127. 
174.  The national data make clear that indeterminacy provides no guarantee of reduced 
imprisonment.  Indeed, the most comprehensive studies have found that parole is associated 
with higher, not lower, imprisonment rates.  See Don Stemen & Andres F. Rengifo, Policies 
and Imprisonment: The Impact of Structured Sentencing and Determinate Sentencing on State 
Incarceration Rates, 1978–2004, 28 JUST. Q. 174, 190 (2011).  However, GCT may operate 
differently than other forms of indeterminacy in that it relies less centrally on official 
discretion.  Cf. id. at 194 (asserting that eliminating discretionary parole may lead to lower 
imprisonment rates because doing so “insulates release decisions from politics, emotion, and 
the social forces that may lead to higher incarceration rates over time”). 
175.  See Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment and 
Reoffending, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115, 178 (Michael Tonry 
ed., 2009) (“[A] key finding of our review is that the great majority of studies point to a null 
or criminogenic effect of the prison experience on subsequent offending.”). 
176.  More information about the Poll is available through its website Marquette 
University Law School Poll, MARQ. U. L. SCH. POLL, https://law.marquette.edu/poll/ (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/G8WS-4YX7. 
177.  Complete results and data from each survey can be found at Results & Data, 
MARQ. U. L. SCH. POLL, https://law.marquette.edu/poll/results-data/ (last visited Nov. 8, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LAH5-HGM3.  The 2014 Poll was comprised of 804 
Wisconsin registered voters.  Methodology: Marquette University Law School Poll, July 2014, 
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Although none of the three surveys asked directly about good 
conduct time, the results nonetheless strongly suggest that most 
Wisconsin voters would be open to a well-designed GCT proposal.  
Some of the most pertinent results included strong support for each of 
the following statements: 
 • “Criminals who have genuinely turned their lives around deserve 
a second chance”: 85% of Wisconsin voters agree, while only 10% 
disagree.178 
 • “If the prison system did more to foster rehabilitation, Wisconsin 
would be a safer place”: 70% agree, 20% disagree.179 
 • “Wisconsin should recognize prisoners’ rehabilitative 
accomplishments by awarding credits toward early release”: 67% 
agree, 24% disagree.180 
 • In determining a prisoner’s release date, it is important to take 
into account his “record of good behavior in prison”: 88% say 
either “very important” or “somewhat import,” while only 11% 
say “not important.”181 
 
MARQ. U. L. SCH. POLL, http://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/MLSP22
Methodology.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AZM2-XH2E.  Both landline (sixty-seven 
percent of the sample) and cell phone (thirty-three percent of the sample) numbers were 
included in the random digit dialing technique.  Id.  The margin of error for a single 
percentage in a sample of 804 respondents is plus or minus 3.5 percentage points.  Id. 
The 2012 and 2013 Polls were administered in the same manner.  The 2013 Poll was 
comprised of 713 Wisconsin registered voters and had a margin of error of 3.7 percentage 
points.  Methodology: Marquette University Law School Poll, July 2013, MARQ. U. L. SCH. 
POLL, available at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/MLSP17Metho
dology.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L3H8-XA9C.  The 2012 Poll was comprised of 697 
registered voters and had a margin of error of plus or minus 3.8 percentage points.  
Methodology: Marquette University Law School Poll, July 5–8, 2012, MARQ. U. L. SCH. POLL, 
available at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/MLSP8_Methdology.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/TCM4-9TYF. 
178.  MARQ. UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL TOPLINES—
JULY 5–8, 2012, at Q26a (2012) [hereinafter 2012 TOPLINES], available at 
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/MLSP8_Toplines.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9A5S-2P3Z. 
179.  Id. at Q26b. 
180.  Id. at Q26c. 
181.  MARQ. UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL, JULY 15–
18, 2013, at Q24 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 TOPLINES], available at https://law.marquette.edu/po
ll/results-data/, archived at http://perma.cc/8F6B-WK2C. 
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Perhaps most remarkably, we found that 55% of voters in 2012,182 
and 54.5% of voters in 2013,183 agreed that “[o]nce a prisoner has served 
at least half of his term, he should be released from prison and given a 
less costly form of punishment if he can demonstrate that he is no longer 
a threat to society.”184  If adopted, such a reform would at least arguably 
be a far more radical departure from hyper-determinacy than the Doyle 
reforms of 2009–2011.185  Moreover, in 2014, an even higher percentage 
of respondents (66.4%) agreed with a more moderate version of the 
statement, calling for potential release at the two-thirds mark of the 
prison term.186 
To be sure, we also found substantial support for truth in sentencing: 
sixty-three percent in 2012187 and sixty-six percent in 2013.188  But, given 
comparable levels of support for various forms of indeterminacy, it is 
clear that not all TIS supporters equate TIS with hyper-determinacy.  
Recall, in fact, that many states have adopted “truth in sentencing” laws 
that are not nearly as rigid as Wisconsin’s.189  Indeed, for purposes of our 
survey, we defined “truth in sentencing” by reference to the abolition of 
parole,190 so much of the popular support for TIS may result from 
particular negative associations with parole in Wisconsin,191 rather than 
from a more generalized opposition to indeterminacy. 
Support for more flexible approaches likely comes in part from a 
widespread belief that the correctional system can and should do more 
to promote prisoner rehabilitation.  Again, seventy percent agreed that 
“[i]f the prison system did more to foster rehabilitation, Wisconsin 
would be a safer place.”192  Similarly, 74.1% of respondents indicated 
that it was “very important” or “absolutely essential” for the criminal-
justice system to rehabilitate offenders and help them to become 
 
182.  2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q26g. 
183.  2013 TOPLINES, supra note 181, at Q19. 
184.  2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q26g.  
185.  See supra Part II.D. 
186.  2014 TOPLINES, supra note 138, at Q30. 
187.  2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q25c. 
188.  2013 TOPLINES, supra note 181, at Q23. 
189.  See SABOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 7–9. 
190.  MARQ. UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL—JULY 
15−18, 2013, at Q21 (2013), available at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/20
13/07/MLSP17Instrument.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NA9S-8W3C. 
191.  See supra Part II.C. 
192.  2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q26b. 
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contributing members of society.193  We have indeed come a long way 
from the era of “nothing works.”   
Support for flexibility also likely comes in part from a desire for the 
state to do a better job of reserving expensive prison beds for the truly 
dangerous.  Note, for instance, the way that the question about halfway 
release was framed: “once a prisoner has served at least half of his term, 
he should be released from prison and given a less costly form of 
punishment . . . .”  Further underscoring the importance of cost 
considerations was the high level of support we found for this statement: 
Prisons are a government spending program, and just like any 
other government program, they should be put to the cost–
benefit test.  States should analyze their prison populations and 
figure out if there are offenders in expensive prison cells who can 
be safely and effectively supervised in the community at a lower 
cost.194 
More than fifty-five percent of Wisconsin voters indicated that the 
foregoing better reflected their views than this contrasting statement: 
“People who commit crimes belong behind bars, end of story.  It may 
cost a lot of money to run prisons, but it would cost society more in the 
long run if more criminals were on the street.”195 
Yet, there is also reason to believe that much of the support for 
flexibility derives from moral considerations, and not just instrumental 
objectives like reducing recidivism and saving money.  For instance, a 
full fifty-eight percent of our respondents indicated that recognizing 
rehabilitative accomplishments with earlier release would be “the right 
thing to do” even if it did not reduce crime.196  Similarly, fifty-four 
percent of our respondents felt that “[e]ven if truth in sentencing does 
not reduce crime, it would still be the right thing to do.”197  Additionally, 
we found no statistically significant relationship between fear of crime 
and support for either TIS or halfway release.198  Our results were thus 
consistent with earlier research indicating that public support for some 
 
193.  2014 TOPLINES, supra note 138, at Q28c. 
194.  MARQ. UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, supra note 190, at Q19, Q20. 
195.  Id.; 2013 TOPLINES, supra note 181, at Q20. 
196.  2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q26d. 
197.  Id. at Q25d. 
198.  O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 29, 42). 
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penal policies is influenced more by moral-symbolic than instrumental 
considerations.199 
Although our Wisconsin data point to widespread public receptivity 
to more flexible penal policies, they also highlight some areas of 
sensitivity that must be taken into account by reformers.  Simply put, 
many Wisconsin voters are skeptical that there are large numbers of 
prisoners who ought at present to be released.  We found that fifty-eight 
percent of our respondents disagreed with the statement that “[m]any of 
the people who are locked up in prison do not deserve to be there.”200  
Moreover, only thirty-seven percent agreed, and forty-eight percent 
disagreed, with the statement that “[m]any of the people who are locked 
up in prison could be safely released without endangering the 
community.”201  These views may be related to the common perception 
that sentences tend to be overly lenient, especially for recidivists.202  To 
be sure, earlier research makes clear that these sorts of views are based 
on misinformation about the criminal justice system—incorrect 
generalizations from the very small percentage of cases that are covered 
in the media.203  In principle, then, it seems possible that some of the 
skepticism might be overcome through a public education campaign.  
Still, reservations about the justice and safety of a large-scale program of 
early releases might lend support to reform approaches whose impact 
will unfold only at relatively slow pace, giving the public some 
reassurance that releases will not be indiscriminate or overwhelm 
community-supervision systems.   
B. Support for Indeterminacy in the Nation as a Whole 
A multitude of recent national polls help to confirm and further 
illuminate results from the Marquette Law School Poll in Wisconsin.  
Although these polls are national in nature, it should be recalled that 
Wisconsin is a “purple” state that sits somewhere close to the nation’s 
 
199.  Tom R. Tyler & Robert Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, But Why? 
The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237, 
255 (1997). 
200.  2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q27d. 
201.  Id. at Q27e. 
202.  We found that sixty-two percent agree that the “courts are too lenient with 
criminals,” while nearly eighty-four percent agree that we “need tougher prison sentences for 
repeat offenders.”  2013 TOPLINES, supra note 181, at Q16–17. 
203.  TONRY, supra note 100, at 34–36. 
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political center of gravity.204  Thus, Wisconsin’s public opinion in the 
highly politicized field of criminal justice is not likely much different 
from what one might find in the nation as a whole. 
National surveys find considerable interest in reducing the size of 
the U.S. prison population.  The Pew Center, for instance, found that 
forty-five percent of respondents believe that we lock up too many 
people today, as against only twenty-eight percent who believe that the 
prison population is “about right” and thirteen percent who think we 
lock up too few.205   
In part, these attitudes may reflect fiscal concerns.  For instance, 
seventy-eight percent said that it would be acceptable to reduce prison 
time for low-risk, nonviolent offenders in order to close budget 
deficits.206  However, it may be that the public’s desire is less to reduce 
corrections spending per se than to reallocate the dollars in ways that 
more cost-effectively protect public safety.  Consider these results: 
 • Eighty-four percent agree that “[s]ome of the money that we are 
spending on locking up low-risk, non-violent inmates should be 
shifted to strengthening community corrections programs like 
probation and parole.”207 
 
204.  Wisconsin was among the nation’s most hotly contested states in both the 2000 and 
2004 Presidential elections.  In 2000, Democrat Al Gore defeated Republican George W. 
Bush by fewer than 6,000 votes out of more than 2.5 million cast.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE 
REFERENCE BUREAU, 2001–2002 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 936 (2001).  In 2004, Democrat 
John F. Kerry edged out Bush by barely 11,000 votes out of nearly three million cast.  WIS. 
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, 2005–2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 936 (2005).  
Although Barack Obama won more convincing victories in 2008 and 2012, neither 
Republican Senator Ron Johnson in 2010 nor Democratic Senator Tammy Baldwin in 2012 
managed to win even fifty-two percent of the vote.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE 
BUREAU, 2013–2014 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 880, 920 (2013); WIS. LEGISLATIVE 
REFERENCE BUREAU, 2011–2012 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 882 (2011); WIS. LEGISLATIVE 
REFERENCE BUREAU, 2009–2010 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 932 (2010).  In gubernatorial 
politics, Republican Scott Walker defeated Democrat Tom Barrett by about 125,000 votes 
out of more than two million cast in 2010, and then again by about 170,000 out of nearly 2.5 
million in a nationally prominent recall election in 2012.  WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE 
BUREAU, 2013–2014 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra, at 912; WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE 
BUREAU, 2011–2012 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra, at 912.  Of course, the facts that 
Republican Walker and Democrat Obama both won in 2012, and that Wisconsin is 
represented in the U.S. Senate by both Republican Johnson and Democrat Baldwin, 
demonstrate the closely divided character of the state’s politics. 
205.  PEW 2012, supra note 169, at 2. 
206.  Id. at 4. 
207.  Id. at 1. 
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 • Eighty-five percent would accept reducing prison time for low-
risk nonviolent offenders in order to reinvest in alternatives.208 
 • Eighty-seven percent agree that “[p]risons are a government 
program, and just like any other government program they need 
to be put to the cost-benefit test to make sure taxpayers are 
getting the best bang for their buck.”209 
 • Sixty percent say that sending fewer nonserious offenders to 
prison may be justified by the availability of alternatives that 
decrease reoffending.210 
 • Sixty-three percent disfavor mandatory sentencing laws for 
nonviolent drug crimes, and sixty-seven percent say that the 
government should focus on providing treatment for drug users 
rather than prosecuting them.211 
Implicit in these findings are beliefs that rehabilitation is a feasible 
goal for many offenders.  These views are more explicit in a number of 
other findings: 
 • Fifty-eight percent say that prevention or rehabilitation should be 
the top priority for dealing with crime, as opposed to only 
nineteen percent who favor longer sentences and more prisons.212 
 • Seventy-nine percent agree that “under the right conditions, 
many offenders can turn their lives around.”213 
 • Sixty-one percent said it was “very important” to put nonviolent 
offenders in treatment/job/education programs.214 
 
208.  Id. at 4. 
209.  Id. at 7. 
210.  CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY, ATTITUDES OF US VOTERS TOWARD NONSERIOUS OFFENDERS AND 
ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION 8 (2009). 
211.  PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S NEW DRUG POLICY LANDSCAPE: TWO-
THIRDS FAVOR TREATMENT, NOT JAIL, FOR USE OF HEROIN, COCAINE 1 (2014). 
212.  PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT’L FOR THE NAT’L CTR FOR STATE 
COURTS, supra note 104, at 20. 
213.  Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
214.  Id. at 38. 
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For nonviolent offenders, in particular, the public seems open to 
early release in a number of circumstances.  The Pew Center found that 
eighty-six percent would accept reduced prison time for completion of 
programs, eighty-three percent for good behavior in prison, and 
seventy-seven percent for age or illness.215 
V. GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
A review of the GCT laws in other jurisdictions helps to confirm that 
this particular form of indeterminacy has been found broadly acceptable 
in the United States, and also serves to highlight some of the specific 
policy decisions that must be made if Wisconsin chooses to reinstitute 
good conduct time.  This Part begins with a general overview of the laws 
of other states and then focuses on a few jurisdictions in more detail. 
A. Overview 
Good conduct time has proven a remarkably durable feature of 
American penal policy.  As noted above, good conduct time made its 
U.S. appearance more than one hundred and sixty years ago, and was 
established in all forty-six states by 1910.216  More than seventy years 
later, in 1982, Professor James Jacobs reported that good conduct time 
was still employed in forty-six states.217  Of course, Wisconsin would 
eliminate good conduct time just two years later, and the Badger State 
was hardly alone in curtailing or eliminating good conduct time in that 
time period.  My 2012 study, however, found GCT still in place in 
twenty-nine states, a clear majority.218  Moreover, there has been a 
recent trend in favor of GCT, with at least ten states expanding 
 
215.  PEW 2012, supra note 169, at 4. 
216.  See supra Part II.A. 
217.  James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
217, 226 (1982). 
218.  O’Hear, supra note 1, at 197.  This is just the number of states with good conduct 
time for inmates in state prisons.  If one also included states that permitted good conduct time 
for inmates in local jails, the number would be higher.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 302.43 (2011–
2012) (“Every inmate of a county jail is eligible to earn good [conduct] time in the amount of 
one-fourth of his or her term for good behavior if sentenced to at least 4 days . . . .”).  Note 
also that my count distinguishes good conduct time, which provides credits for good behavior, 
from earned time, which provides credits for participation in certain rehabilitative programs.  
O’Hear, supra note 1, at 197 nn.10–11.  See generally ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CUTTING CORRECTIONS COSTS: EARNED TIME 
POLICIES FOR STATE PRISONERS (2009). 
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eligibility or otherwise liberalizing their programs since 2003.219 
Additionally, GCT has been approved as part of the American Law 
Institute’s ongoing Model Penal Code: Sentencing project.220 
The amount of good conduct time available varies considerably by 
jurisdiction, and within some jurisdictions based on offense type and 
other considerations.221 Seven states offer day-for-day credit or better to 
at least some classes of inmates; in these states, a sentence might 
effectively be cut in half based on good conduct.222  Other states are 
much stingier, awarding only three or four days of credit per month.223  
Still other states have quite elaborate systems that defy easy 
characterization.224  The norm, however, seems to be in the range of ten 
to twenty days per month, or a reduction in sentence length of twenty-
five to forty percent.225  
In general, good conduct time is awarded automatically to eligible 
inmates, although the statutes of two states expressly contemplate an 
inmate-by-inmate monthly review as a condition of granting credit.226  
Most GCT states make credit available to all or nearly all of their prison 
inmates, but other states have adopted a wide range of categorical 
 
219.  O’Hear, supra note 106, app. at 1288–92 (Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).  Note that the ten include 
Wisconsin, which adopted and then repealed good conduct time as part of the 2009 Doyle 
reforms.  See supra Part II.D. 
220  AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING—TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 3, 
§ 305.1 (2014).  
221.  O’Hear, supra note 106, app. at 1288–92.  The remainder of this Section is adapted 
from, and closely tracks, O’Hear, supra note 1, at 200–02.  For further details of specific state 
laws and statutory citations, see O’Hear, supra note 106, app. at 1288–92.  Even more detailed 
information about the GCT programs in fifteen southern states circa 2001 can be found in 
TODD EDWARDS, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, CORRECTIONAL GOOD-TIME CREDITS IN 
SOUTHERN STATES (2001). 
222.  These states are Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina (for impaired driving 
offenses only), Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia.  O’Hear, supra note 1, at 200 n.18. 
223.  Delaware inmates cap out at three days per month, as do South Carolina inmates 
serving time on no-parole offenses, while Maine limits good conduct time to four days per 
month.  Id. at 200 n.19. 
224.  Examples include Oklahoma and New Jersey.  Id. at 200 n.20. 
225.  Different states express this idea differently.  Alaska and New York offer one-third 
off the sentence.  Nevada offers a credit of twenty days per month, as does South Carolina for 
paroleable offenses.  Colorado and Wyoming offer a credit of fifteen days per month.  New 
Hampshire offers a credit of 12.5 days per month.  Kentucky, Maryland, and Rhode Island 
offer a credit of ten days per month.  South Dakota offers a credit of either four or six months 
per year, depending on the length of the sentence.  Id. at 200 n.21. 
226.  N.H REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:22(I) (2007 & Supp. 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-21-236(a)(3) (2010). 
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exclusions.  For instance, some exclude inmates who have committed 
serious violent or sexual offenses,227 or who have killed a law 
enforcement officer.228  Others require that an inmate work or 
participate in an education or rehabilitative program in order to be 
eligible for good conduct time.229 
Once awarded, credits may be forfeited for misconduct. Normally, 
any fresh criminal offense committed in prison or any violation of prison 
rules will suffice.  A few states limit forfeiture by statute to more serious 
violations.230  Other states, however, are even more expansive than the 
norm in what can lead to forfeiture.  New York, for instance, authorizes 
forfeiture for “bad behavior” and “failure to perform properly . . . 
[assigned] duties.”231  Once forfeiture is ordered, corrections officials 
have broad discretion in determining how much good conduct time to 
take away.232  In many states, they also have discretion either to restore 
lost good conduct time233 or to suspend forfeitures.234  In any event, the 
 
227.  Louisiana and Maine are examples.  Id. at 200 n.23. 
228.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 138(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014). 
229.  States falling into this category include Massachusetts, Missouri, Oklahoma, and 
Texas.  O’Hear, supra note 1, at 200 n.25. 
230.  For instance, New Jersey’s statute speaks in terms of “flagrant misconduct,” and 
Michigan’s of “major misconduct.”  Id. at 200 n.26. 
231.  N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 803(1)(a) (Consol. 2005 & Supp. 2014). 
232.  This discretion is limited by statute in some states in a variety of ways.  For 
instance, Delaware specifies that all good conduct time is lost when certain inmates are 
convicted of a fresh crime.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4382(a) (2007).  Rhode Island has a 
simple day-for-day rule: “[f]or every day [that] a prisoner [is] shut up or otherwise disciplined 
for bad conduct . . . there shall be deducted one day” from the prisoner’s good-conduct time.  
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(d) (2006 & Supp. 2013).  Illinois caps forfeiture at one year per 
infraction, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-6-3(5)(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014), and Louisiana 
at 180 days, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.4(B)(3) (2012 & Supp. 2013). 
233.  ALA. CODE § 14-9-41(f)(2) (LexisNexis 2007); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(5)(c) 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2014); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-709(c) (LexisNexis 2008); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.33(5) (West 1998 & Supp. 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 651-A:22(IV)(c) (2007 & Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 138(A) (West 2004 & 
Supp. 2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 421.121(4) (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(e) (2006 & 
Supp. 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN § 28-5-27(f) (LexisNexis 2013); N. CAROLINA DEP’T OF 
CORR., DIV. OF PRISONS, POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL, ch. B, § .0111(c) (Sept. 5, 2013), 
available at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/policy_procedure_manual/b0100.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/63WH-5DAG. 
234.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4382(b) (2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 498.004(a), 
(c) (West 2012). 
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decision-making procedures are internal, administrative procedures, 
without the protections normally associated with criminal trials.235 
B. Specific Jurisdictions 
1. Federal System 
 The federal criminal justice system is no one’s idea of lenient.  In 
1984, Congress adopted a new sentencing regime that eliminated parole 
and set the federal system on a track to rapidly escalating penalties.236  
However, a longstanding good-time provision remained part of the new 
regime.  To this day, at the end of each year of imprisonment, a federal 
inmate may receive up to fifty-four days of good-time credit,237 which 
can add up to about a fifteen percent reduction in prison time—a rather 
 
235.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-9-41(f)(2) (LexisNexis 2007) (Commissioner of the 
Department of Corrections decides based on evidence submitted by the warden in charge); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-301(3) (2013) (“[G]ood time authorized . . . shall not vest and 
may be withheld or deducted by the department.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1253(9)(B) 
(2006 & Supp. 2013) (“Any portion of the time deducted from the sentence . . . may be 
withdrawn by the chief administrative officer of the state facility . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., 
CORR. SERVS. § 3-709(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (“If an inmate violates the applicable rules of 
discipline, the Division [of Correction] may revoke a portion or all of the diminution 
credits . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.451(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (“The decision of the 
director regarding a forfeiture is final.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-140 (West 2008) (“In case of 
any flagrant misconduct the board of managers may declare a forfeiture . . . as to them shall 
seem just.”); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560–62, 568–70 (1974) (holding that 
Due Process Clause requires fewer procedural protections in connection with loss of good 
conduct time than in connection with revocation of parole; inmates do not have right to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses or right to counsel in prison disciplinary 
proceedings). 
236.  Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 749, 772–76, 783 (2006); see also Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local 
Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing 
Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 730–32 (2002).  Although precise cross-system severity 
comparisons are not possible, some sense of the federal system’s relative harshness can be 
seen through sentencing patterns in drug cases, which probably constitute the most practically 
significant area of overlap between federal and state criminal dockets.  In the most recent 
years for which data are available, federal courts sentenced 96.5% of drug traffickers to 
prison, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, at tbl.12 (2013), while state courts in the nation’s seventy-five largest counties 
only imprisoned forty-five percent of their drug traffickers, BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL 
TABLES 29 tlb.24 (2013).  Moreover, the average (mean) prison sentence in the federal system 
for drug traffickers was seventy-two months, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra, at tbl.13, as 
compared to only forty-nine months in the seventy-five largest counties, REAVES, supra, at 30 
tbl.25. 
237.  18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2012). 
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modest benefit compared to what many states offer.  Moreover, at the 
end of a year, if the Bureau of Prisons determines that an inmate “has 
not satisfactorily complied with . . . institutional regulations,” then the 
Bureau may award no credit or some other amount less than fifty-four 
days.238   
The Bureau has promulgated a detailed schedule of prohibited acts 
and available sanctions, including the forfeiture and disallowance of 
good conduct time.239  Additional regulations spell out mandatory losses 
of GCT in certain circumstances.240  For instance, narcotics use in prison 
is considered a “greatest severity level prohibited act,” and thus results 
in a mandatory disallowance of at least forty-one of the fifty-four days of 
possible credit in the year in which the violation occurred, as well as a 
potential forfeiture of up to 100% of already-earned good conduct 
time.241  By contrast, the use of obscene language is a “low severity level 
prohibited act,” and, for a second offense in six months, will “ordinarily” 
result in the disallowance of only one to seven days of good conduct 
time.242 
Despite a very long list of violations that may result in a loss of 
good conduct time,243 the vast majority of federal prisoners benefit from 
the program.  In FY 2011, for instance, more than sixty-three percent of 
 
238.  Id.  The amount of good conduct time is reduced to forty-two days for inmates who 
have not earned and are not making satisfactory progress toward earning a GED.  28 C.F.R. 
§ 523.20(c) (2013).  On the other hand, federal law does provide for up to an additional year 
of credit for participation in a drug abuse program.  Demleitner, supra note 170, at 787–88.  
There has been some controversy over the way that the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 
calculates GCT credits.  See id. at 785 (“Since the BOP deducts good time from the days 
actually served by the prisoner rather than the sentence imposed by the judge, the maximum 
amount of good time per year is effectively forty-seven days.”).  The Supreme Court affirmed 
the BOP’s approach in Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2511 (2010).  The United States 
Department of Justice supports an increase in the amount of GCT available, both for 
traditional good time and for program completion.  Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, 
Good-Time Credits, and Crowded Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 42 (2013). 
239.  28 C.F.R. § 541.3. 
240.  Id. § 541.4. 
241.  I assume in this example an inmate sentenced for an offense committed on or after 
April 26, 1996.  See id. § 541.4(a)(2). 
242.  Id. § 541.3 tbl.1. 
243.  To give a sense of the frequency of infractions in the federal prison system, one 
study found that about three percent of inmates were involved in some sort of misconduct in 
a single month in 2001.  CAMP ET AL., supra note 162, at 17.  Inmates averaged 2.23 prior 
incidents of misconduct.  Id. at 33 tbl.1. 
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prisoners exiting federal institutions did so on the basis of GCT.244  The 
federal system thus demonstrates that a jurisdiction committed to the 
truth-in-sentencing ideal245 and known for its toughness can also 
maintain a robust GCT program. 
2. Illinois 
Illinois, Wisconsin’s neighbor to the south, has a GCT system that is 
both more complex and, for many offenders, much more generous than 
that of the federal system.  Illinois’s basic good-time rule offers day-for-
day credit—potentially a fifty percent reduction in sentence length.246  
However, Illinois excludes a long list of offenses, mostly of a violent or 
sexual nature, from the basic rule and limits good conduct time in these 
cases to 4.5 days per month247—essentially, the same as the federal rule.  
The day-for-day system dates to Illinois’s determinate sentencing law of 
1977, which eliminated parole in the state.248  Exclusions from day-for-
day credit were subsequently adopted in truth-in-sentencing legislation 
in the 1990s.249  
In addition to this “statutory sentence credit,” Illinois also makes 
available “supplemental sentence credit” to some offenders.250  This 
aspect of the Illinois good-time system recently endured a period of 
 
244.  This number was obtained through a search of the Federal Criminal Case 
Processing Statistics database maintained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. 
Department of Justice.  Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5E9W-SMEB. 
245.  Congress promoted the spread of TIS laws in the 1990s through its truth-in-
sentencing grants to state correctional systems.  PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1 (1999). 
246.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014).  The day-
for-day rule was adopted as part of Illinois’s determinate sentencing law of 1977, which also 
abolished parole.  GOODSTEIN, supra note 170, at 19. 
247.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a)(2), (2.3)–(2.6).  Those convicted of first-degree 
murder or terrorism are prohibited from receiving any sentence credit.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i).   
248.  MALCOLM C. YOUNG, WHITE PAPER: GOOD CONDUCT CREDIT IN ILLINOIS 1 
(2012), available at http://www.usprisonculture.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/White-
Paper-Good-Conduct-Credit-in-Illinois-22-Jan-2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M2TR-
WXUJ. 
249.  See ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 20, § 107.120(g) (2013).   
250.  Id. § 107.107.  Illinois also offers “program sentence credit” for participation in 
various types of programming.  Id.  This sort of credit I would label “earned time” and 
distinguish from “good conduct time.”  See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
supra note 218, at 1.  The Illinois regulations also spell out rules for various other good-time 
programs that apply to certain long-serving inmates who are subject to one of various earlier 
sentencing and corrections systems.  ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 20, § 107.107. 
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substantial public controversy.  In 1990, in order to deal with prison 
overcrowding, the Illinois Legislature authorized the Department of 
Corrections to give inmates up to 180 days of GCT beyond the regular 
day-for-day system.251  Between 1990 and 2009, the Department 
maintained a policy of deferring this discretionary credit until after at 
least sixty days had been served in prison.252  Beginning in 2009, the 
Department ended this sixty-day rule.253  Under the new system, due to 
the interplay between day-for-day credits, supplemental GCT, and 
credit for time served in jail during criminal proceedings, an offender 
with a short (one- or two-year) sentence might be released from prison 
only a few days after entering.254  In ways that echoed the 
contemporaneous public controversy over the Doyle reforms in 
Wisconsin, the media in Illinois publicized the new release policy and 
presented what was likely a misleading picture of its effect on public 
safety.255  In response, the whole supplemental program was first 
suspended, and then the sixty-day rule was legislatively reimposed.256  
With this restriction restored, the Department may once again award up 
to 180 days of supplemental sentence credit.257 
Both statutory and supplemental sentence credit may be lost 
through bad conduct in prison.258  Illinois does not appear to have the 
sort of detailed schedule of specific sanctions for particular infractions 
that the federal system has.  However, inmates may not be deprived of 
more than one year of credit for any one infraction, and lost credit may 
be restored later.259   
 
251.  YOUNG, supra note 248, at 2. 
252.  Id. at 3. 
253.  Id. 
254.  Id. 
255.  Id. 
256.  See Patrick Yeagle, Illinois Starts Giving Prison Inmates Release Credits: IDOC 
Adopts Reformed Program to Lower Prison Population, ILL. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, 
http://illinoistimes.com/article-11086-illinois-starts-giving-prison-inmates-release-credits.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/U32Q-A362. 
257.  ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 20, § 107.210 (2013). 
258.  Id. § 107.150(c). 
259.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014).  The Department may 
unilaterally revoke up to thirty days of credit in a twelve-month period, but must obtain 
approval for more extensive sanctions from the Prisoner Review Board.  ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 
20, § 107.150(c).  Parallel rules govern the restoration of lost credits.  Id. § 107.160(c).  In 
addition to losing credits for infractions, inmates may also lose up to 180 days for filing a 
frivolous lawsuit against the state.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(d).  Additionally, sex 
offenders are ineligible for credit unless they have completed or are participating in sex 
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As of mid-2012, nearly three-quarters (74.7%) of Illinois’s prison 
population qualified for day-for-day credit, while an additional twenty 
percent earned statutory sentence credit at a reduced rate.260  In 2013, in 
the first half-year of the revived supplemental sentence credit program, 
1,974 inmates (or about four percent of the prison population) received 
an average of 114.3 days of supplemental credit.261  During the same 
time, 126 inmates had supplemental credit revoked, with an average 
penalty of 26.9 days.262 
The Illinois story illustrates the political dangers of a good-time 
system that is so generous as to permit releases almost immediately 
upon entry to prison.  But the larger, if much quieter, story from Illinois 
is that the vast majority of offenders entering the state’s prisons over the 
past four decades have qualified for day-for-day credits without 
particular controversy.  In the first wave of national sentencing reform 
(1975–1984), Illinois and Wisconsin took directly opposite approaches.  
While Wisconsin eliminated good conduct time and preserved parole, 
Illinois eliminated parole and preserved GCT.  Illinois’s approach has 
clearly proven the more durable. 
3. Washington 
Like Illinois, Washington has a good-time system that is both more 
complex and more generous than the federal system.  Washington’s 
basic good-time rule provides for a one-third reduction in prison 
terms.263  However, inmates convicted of a serious violent offense or a 
Class A felony sex offense may only earn a ten percent reduction.264  
Washington refers to GCT as “earned release time,” or ERT.265  A 
portion of ERT, referred to as “earned time,” is based on participation 
 
offender treatment, unless treatment is not made available by the Department.  Id. at 5/3-6-
3(4.6).   
260.  ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., FISCAL YEAR 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 50 (2013). 
261.  ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT FOR SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCE CREDIT, 
MARCH 2013–SEPTEMBER 2013 (2014). 
262.  Id. 
263.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.729(3)(d) (West 2010 & Supp. 2014). 
264.  WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-30-030(1)(b) (2011). 
265.  Id. § 137-25-020. 
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in approved programs, including work and school,266 although inmates 
are not penalized if programs are not available.267 
In 2003, Washington temporarily increased the maximum ERT to 
fifty percent of the prison term, but the law had a sunset provision and 
was permitted to expire in 2010.268  One study found that close to one-
quarter of the inmates released from Washington prisons in the first 
thirteen months of the program were eligible for the fifty percent 
reduction.269  These inmates were estimated to serve sixty-three fewer 
days on average as a result of the enhanced ERT program.270  
Interestingly, those released under the program were found to have 
lower recidivism rates relative to appropriate comparison groups 
released before the fifty percent rule went into effect.271 
Under whatever rule earned, ERT may be lost for the commission of 
a “serious infraction,”272 a category that is defined by regulation and 
encompasses a wide range of offenses from possession of an alcoholic 
beverage to escape.273  However, lost ERT may later be restored if the 
inmate manages to avoid any additional serious infractions over a 
twelve-month period.274 
Inmates who have reached their “earned release date,” that is, the 
release date taking into account any ERT reductions, may be required 
to present to the Department of Corrections a viable release plan, 
including approved residence and living arrangements.275  Release may 
be denied if the plan is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of recidivism 
risk or in other specified ways.276  In recent years, substantial numbers of 
inmates, amounting to between sixteen and twenty-three percent of all 
 
266.  Id. § 137-30-030(3)(a).  For instance, inmates under the thirty-three percent rule 
are eligible for five days of earned time per month.  Id. § 137-30-030(3)(a)(3). 
267.  E.K. DRAKE, R. BARNOSKI & S. AOS, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, 
INCREASED EARNED RELEASE FROM PRISON: IMPACTS OF A 2003 LAW ON RECIDIVISM 
AND CRIME COSTS, REVISED 2 n.7 (2009). 
268.  Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 429–
30 (2011). 
269.  DRAKE ET AL., supra note 267, at 4. 
270.  Id. at 8 n.26. 
271.  Id. at 7. 
272.  WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-30-030(2)(c) (2011).   
273.  Id. § 137-25-030. 
274.  Id. § 137-30-070(2)(b). 
275.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(5)(b) (West 2010 & Supp. 2014). 
276.  Id. § 9.94A.729(5)(c). 
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releases, have been delayed under this provision, typically by two to 
three months.277 
Although Washington, like Illinois, has recently undergone a process 
of first liberalizing and then tightening up GCT, the basic one-third rule 
has proven a stable, durable feature of Washington’s nationally well-
regarded sentencing and corrections system.278  
VI. GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Although corrections officials have viewed GCT as a helpful device 
for managing prisoners since the nineteenth century, a pair of academic 
researchers could, as late as 1989, lament the absence of “any systematic 
empirical research” on the impact of GCT in practice.279  They observed, 
“There is no empirical evidence that supports or refutes the proposition 
that good time acts as an important tool in controlling the prison 
environment, or that identifies the relationship between good time 
release policies and prisoner behavior in the community.”280 
Twenty-five years later, we now have an increasingly substantial 
body of systematic empirical research on GCT.  The most rigorous 
studies attempt to quantify the impact within a particular state of a 
change to GCT policies.  The effects on which these studies focus are 
prison misconduct, recidivism and crime rates, prison-population size, 
 
277.  WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., EARNED PRISON RELEASE 2 (2013). 
278.  See, e.g., RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 
FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 141, 146 (2013) (noting that Washington sentencing system has 
been “remarkably stable for several decades” and praising Washington sentencing 
commission as “effective and well regarded”).  Washington’s recidivism rate has been 
consistently below both Wisconsin’s and the national average, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, 
STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 11 (2011), 
reflecting steady declines in the state’s repeat offending since 1990, WASH. STATE INST. FOR 
PUB. POLICY, WASHINGTON STATE RECIDIVISM TRENDS: ADULT OFFENDERS RELEASED 
FROM PRISON (1990–2006), at 2 (2011).  Washington’s policymaking in the criminal-justice 
area has been supported by a unique and nationally recognized policy-analysis agency, the 
Washington State Institute for Public Policy.  See John Kamensky, What You Can Learn from 
the Rise of “Moneyball Government,” GOV’T EXECUTIVE, July 26, 2013, http://www.govexec.
com/excellence/promising-practices/2013/07/what-you-can-learn-rise-moneyball-government/
67544/?oref=dropdown, archived at http://perma.cc/4MSC-L6EY.  Washington was a pioneer 
in such areas as the “three strikes” law, ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 100, at 4, and modern 
civil commitment and sex offender registration laws, Richard G. Wright, From Wetterling to 
Walsh: The Growth in Federalization in Sex Offender Policy, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 124, 127 
(2008). 
279.  David Weisburd & Ellen S. Chayet, Good Time: An Agenda for Research, 16 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 183, 187 (1989). 
280.  Id. at 190. 
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and cost-savings.  Summarized in more detail below, these studies are 
generally favorable to GCT.281  However, because there is so much 
variation in state sentencing and corrections policies, caution should be 
exercised in generalizing from any one state’s experience with 
expanding or restricting GCT; a reform that succeeds or fails in one 
policy environment might well produce quite different results elsewhere. 
Florida: In 1983, Florida eliminated discretionary parole, but 
instituted an extremely generous GCT system in order to prevent a 
large increase in the prison population,282 thus echoing Illinois’s 1977 
policy changes.283  Under the new regime, between 1986 and 1994, the 
average time served was only thirty-nine percent of the sentence.284  
Then, in 1995, the Legislature imposed a new cap on GCT, requiring 
that offenders sentenced for crimes committed on or after October 1 of 
that year serve eighty-five percent of their terms.285  In order to measure 
the impact of this restriction of GCT on prisoner misconduct, 
researchers studied the disciplinary records of 305,228 offenders 
sentenced to prison in Florida between 1990 and 2001.286  After 
controlling for twenty-three variables, including those relating to offense 
 
281.  I summarize here only the post-1989 research on GCT.  There are some earlier 
publications discussing the impact of GCT policy reforms, but most suffer from fundamental 
methodological flaws.  For a discussion of these issues, see William D. Bales & Courtenay H. 
Miller, The Impact of Determinate Sentencing on Prisoner Misconduct, 40 J. CRIM. JUST. 394, 
395–96 (2012).  Some of the more sophisticated work in the first generation of scholarship 
focused on emergency release policies implemented in Illinois and Colorado in order to 
address prison overcrowding.  Weisburd & Chayet, supra note 279, at 189.  These studies 
found no difference in the recidivism rates of early-release and regular-release inmates.  Id.  
In any event, apart from qualitative difficulties with some of the earlier research, it also seems 
preferable to focus on more recent studies because of the very different policy environment 
that exists now than in the 1980s.  I omit from textual discussion a 1997 New Jersey parole-
restriction law, which was found in one study, counter-intuitively, to result in a reduced rate 
of violent misconduct among inmates covered by the law.  CANDACE MCCOY & PATRICK 
MCMANIMON, JR., NEW JERSEY’S “NO EARLY RELEASE ACT”: ITS IMPACT ON 
PROSECUTION, SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND VICTIM SATISFACTION 71 (2004).  
Because parole rewards good behavior in a less reliable, transparent fashion than GCT, the 
relationship between parole and inmate misconduct may be quite different than the 
relationship GCT and misconduct. 
282.  Bales & Miller, supra note 281, at 395. 
283.  YOUNG, supra note 248, at 1–2. 
284.  Bales & Miller, supra note 281, at 395. 
285.  Kerensa N. Pate, Florida’s Truth in Sentencing Effectiveness on Recidivism Rates 
10 (Apr. 1, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University), available at 
http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4099&context=etd, archived at http://per
ma.cc/XAA2-XGT8. 
286.  Bales & Miller, supra note 281, at 396. 
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severity and criminal history,287 the researchers found that new-law 
prisoners had 91.1% greater odds of committing a prison infraction over 
a five-year period than did the old-law prisoners.288 
A different researcher, however, found a more positive effect from 
the Florida determinate sentencing law, specifically, on recidivism 
rates.289  Based on an analysis of 182,929 offenders released from Florida 
prisons between 1995 and 2005,290 and controlling for twenty-four 
variables,291 the researcher found that the new-law offenders had a lower 
rate of felony re-offense than the old-law offenders.292  For instance, the 
odds of re-imprisonment for a new felony after three years were 26.9% 
lower for the new-law offenders than the old-law offenders.293  It is not 
clear why offenders in the more determinate regime had reduced 
recidivism; possibilities include enhanced specific deterrence and more 
time in prison to complete rehabilitative programs.294 
New York: In 1997, New York’s Legislature authorized a Merit 
Time Program, which allowed for certain non-violent inmates to earn up 
to a one-sixth reduction of the minimum term of confinement if they 
achieved significant programmatic objectives and avoided any serious 
disciplinary infractions.295  In 2007, the State’s Department of 
Corrections Services performed a systematic review of the Program’s 
first few years.296  By 2006, New York had released about 24,000 inmates 
under the Program, on average about six months before their court-
established minimum terms.297  The Department of Corrections Services 
determined that the Program had saved taxpayers about $372 million in 
operating costs and $15 million in capital construction.298  Additionally, 
the Department found a lower recidivism rate among the early-release 
 
287.  Id. at 398 tbl.2. 
288.  Id. at 400.  The finding was statistically significant at a level of p<.001.  Id. 
289.  Pate, supra note 285, at 50. 
290.  Id. at 37, 39. 
291.  Id. at 46. 
292.  Id. at 50.  The finding was statistically significant at a level of p<.001.  Id.  
293.  Id. 
294.  Id. at 75–77. 
295.  N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., MERIT TIME PROGRAM SUMMARY: OCTOBER 
1997−DECEMBER 2006, at i (2007), available at http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Research/Reports/20
07/Merit_Time_Through_2006.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J673-8DPY. 
296.  Id. 
297.  Id. 
298.  Id. at 15. 
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inmates than among nearly all other comparison groups.299  For instance, 
thirty-one percent of the early-release inmates were returned to prison 
within three years, as compared to a thirty-nine percent figure for all 
others.300   
North Carolina: In 1994, North Carolina adopted a new Structured 
Sentencing Act (SSA), which abolished the state’s prior GCT system.301  
Pre-SSA inmates were “credited with ‘good time’ equal to half of their 
sentences, and were potentially eligible for parole.”302  Under the SSA, 
by contrast, inmates were limited to “earned time” based on program 
participation, which could at most reduce their sentences by seventeen 
percent.303  Beginning in late 1994, some inmates were admitted to the 
North Carolina prison system under the old GCT rules and some under 
the new SSA, depending on the date on which they committed their 
offense.304  Taking advantage of this “natural experiment” involving two 
inmate groups admitted at the same time under different rules,305 
researchers analyzed the disciplinary records of nearly 7,000 offenders 
who entered prison during the transitional period.306  Controlling for 
eight variables, including offense of conviction and prior incarceration, 
the researchers found a much higher rate of discipline (nearly twenty 
percent higher) among the SSA inmates than the pre-SSA inmates.307  
Complementing this result, the researchers also found in interviews that 
“disciplinary system personnel and nearly all of the administrators, 
correctional officers, and case managers expressed the opinion that SSA 
inmates are harder to manage and present more disciplinary problems 
than [pre-SSA] inmates.”308  
 
299.  Id. at iii. 
300.  Id. 
301.  John M. Memory, Guang Guo, Ken Parker & Tom Sutton, Comparing 
Disciplinary Infraction Rates of North Carolina Fair Sentencing and Structured Sentencing 
Inmates: A Natural Experiment, 79 PRISON J. 45, 45 (1999). 
302.  Id. at 46. 
303.  Id. 
304.  See id. 
305.  Id. at 53–54. 
306.  Id. at 60 tbl.1. 
307.  Id. at 57, 65. 
308.  Id. at 62.  Another group of researchers has replicated the quantitative results in a 
separate study using more control variables.  JAMES J. COLLINS ET AL., RESEARCH 
TRIANGLE INST., EVALUATION OF NORTH CAROLINA’S STRUCTURED SENTENCING LAW 
54–56 (1999).  They found that the SSA inmates “had higher overall infraction rates—25% 
higher for males and 55% higher for females.”  Id. at 76. 
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Washington: The Washington State Institute for Public Policy 
conducted a thorough study of the impact of the 2003 expansion of 
earned time.309  Controlling for thirteen variables, the Institute 
compared the recidivism rates of inmates released under the new law 
with the recidivism rates of three appropriate comparison groups.310  
Those released earlier under the more generous GCT law exhibited 
small, but statistically significant reductions in felony recidivism.311  
Taking into account the economic value of reduced recidivism plus 
savings in the costs of imprisonment, the Institute calculated that each 
early release under the new law saved $15,359.312  The Institute also 
calculated an average cost of $8,179 from each release as a result of lost 
incapacitation.313  Nonetheless, the benefits remained significantly larger 
than the costs, with about $1.88 in benefits for each $1 in cost.314 
In sum, four of five studies discussed here point to benefits from 
GCT laws in such areas as prison discipline, recidivism, and corrections 
budgets.  The fifth study, by contrast, pointed to negative effects on 
recidivism.  It should be recalled, however, that this study did not deal 
with a state that eliminated GCT, but rather shifted from an extremely 
generous, Illinois-type program to a more restrained, federal-type 
program.  Even if some rolling back of extremely generous programs 
can produce recidivism-related benefits, one should not infer that full 
elimination would necessarily be even more beneficial, especially in light 
of the more positive recidivism findings in New York and Washington.   
VII.A PROPOSAL FOR GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN WISCONSIN 
A. The Case for Good Conduct Time: A Recapitulation 
The key points of the preceding five parts of this Essay can be 
summarized as follows: 
 • Good conduct by prisoners should be encouraged and recognized.  
Policies along these lines send an important message that we hope 
and expect prisoners to use their time behind bars constructively 
and to emerge from imprisonment prepared to resume their lives 
 
309.  For background, see supra Part V.B.3. 
310.  DRAKE ET AL., supra note 267, at 6. 
311.  Id. 
312.  Id. at 8. 
313.  Id. at 9. 
314.  Id. 
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in the community as law-abiding citizens.  Conversely, rigidly 
invariable prison terms embody a harshly exclusionary attitude 
that seems to deny the offender’s capacity for improvement.  As 
the Supreme Court has recognized, a hopeless prison term is 
morally and sometimes even constitutionally suspect. 
 • For almost as long as prisons have been used as a standard form 
of punishment in the United States, it has been recognized that 
GCT credits are a useful tool for promoting institutional order 
and prisoner rehabilitation, and preferable on pragmatic and 
humanitarian grounds to a purely punitive disciplinary strategy.  
Even through all of the national ferment in sentencing and 
corrections policy in the final quarter of the twentieth century, 
most states chose to retain GCT, and empirical research is 
increasingly providing support for this choice. 
 • Fairly or not, parole had acquired some very negative associations 
by the time it was abolished in Wisconsin in the late 1990s.  It is 
important to remember, though, that GCT and parole have quite 
distinct histories and structures.  Indeed, Wisconsin had GCT for 
several decades before it implemented parole.  Meanwhile, 
Illinois, Washington, and the federal system provide illustrations 
of jurisdictions that chose to retain GCT even after eliminating 
parole.  There is nothing unusual or illogical about having the one 
and dispensing with the other. 
 • The arguments made against parole in Wisconsin either do not 
apply, or apply with much less force, to good conduct time.  
 • There is nothing undemocratic about an elected legislature 
imposing new rules for the way that a prison sentence is executed, 
even if doing so modestly diminishes the discretionary power of 
judges over punishment.  
 • Good conduct time can be implemented in ways that are 
transparent to victims and provide ample advance notice of when 
offenders will be released. 
 • There is no reason that good conduct time must necessarily result 
in significantly earlier releases for high-risk inmates, and, indeed, 
as the empirical research suggests, GCT may actually enhance 
public safety by supporting prisoners’ rehabilitative efforts, 
improving order and discipline in prisons, and helping to move 
low-risk inmates out of costly prison beds. 
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 • Polling results indicate that Wisconsin voters would welcome 
more flexibility with release dates, especially if this could be 
accomplished without compromising public safety.  Voters are 
especially attuned to whether policies in this area “do the right 
thing” in a moral-symbolic sense.  
B. How to Structure Good Conduct Time in Wisconsin 
The case for GCT is a strong one, but, in deciding how to structure 
such a program in Wisconsin, it is also important to take into account a 
variety of additional considerations.  Victims, and for that matter also 
offenders and other stakeholders, deserve a transparent system that 
makes decisions in a reasonably objective, predictable way.  In light of 
their local knowledge and accountability, it is appropriate for judges still 
to play a leading—if no longer quite so hegemonic—role in setting the 
basic parameters of punishment.  Rewards for good conduct should be 
proportional to the significance of the conduct.  Corrections officials 
should have some ability to defer release dates when it is clear to them 
that public safety would otherwise be jeopardized.  The administrative 
burdens on corrections and court personnel should be minimized. 
These various considerations are sufficiently in tension with one 
another that no specific reform proposal can hope to accommodate all 
of them fully.  The goal cannot be a perfect or cost-free system, but must 
rather be a balanced system that reflects a due regard for all of the 
relevant interests and avoids unnecessary or excessive costs in relation 
to any of them. 
In my view, Washington’s GCT system exhibits just this sort of a 
good balance.  It is, moreover, a time-tested system in a state that has 
long been regarded as a national leader in the criminal-justice field.315  
In broad outline, then, my proposal would be for Wisconsin to adopt the 
Washington model, although, as detailed below, I would favor 
deviations from this model in a few specific respects.   
1. Maximum Amount of GCT Discount 
Washington’s maximum GCT discount, amounting to one-third of 
the prison term, lies in the middle range nationally.  It is, for instance, 
roughly midway in generosity between the federal and Illinois laws.  To 
be sure, reasonable arguments could be made for a federal-level (fifteen 
 
315.  See supra note 278. 
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percent) or an Illinois-level (fifty percent) credit, or any point between 
those extremes.  No research has identified a “magic number” that 
maximizes benefits and minimizes costs.  The goal is to provide 
meaningful encouragement and recognition of good conduct in prison 
without reintroducing such variability or unpredictability into the system 
that judicial sentencing decisions would lose their significance or victims 
would be put in an unfair position for the purpose of release 
preparations.  Washington’s one-third rule seems to strike the balance 
appropriately, and has also been endorsed recently by other 
commentators.316  It is also in line with the thirty percent GCT discount 
included in the American Law Institute’s ongoing Model Penal Code: 
Sentencing project.317  Moreover, polling results in Wisconsin—finding 
two-thirds support for release as early as the two-thirds mark of the 
sentence—suggest that a properly designed one-third discount might 
find wide support among voters, and materially more so than a one-half 
discount.318 
A one-third discount could be implemented through a credit system 
of fifteen days per month.  Every month that an inmate earns the 
maximum possible GCT would be treated, in effect, as 1.5 months 
served.  Projected release dates could be automatically adjusted at the 
end of each month to reflect GCT. 
2. Conditions for Earning GCT 
Views differ on whether and to what extent GCT should be available 
simply for remaining discipline-free, as opposed to exhibiting more 
affirmative evidence of pro-social behavior or rehabilitative effort.  
Again, Washington’s approach strikes an appealing balance: maximum 
GCT requires “participat[ion] in approved programs, including work 
and school,”319 but the credit does not depend entirely on this.   
Remaining discipline-free for a significant period of time is an 
accomplishment that merits recognition, particularly in light of the many 
 
316.  For instance, Professor Richard Frase, in his recent comprehensive blueprint for 
reform of U.S. sentencing systems, also supports a maximum one-third GCT discount, tied in 
part to program participation.  For his defense of this approach, see FRASE, supra note 278, at 
69–71.  Dean Demleitner favors a similar approach.  Demleitner, supra note 170, at 796.  The 
United States Department of Justice has also recently endorsed GCT reforms that would 
permit up to a one-third discount, based in part on program completion.  Larkin, supra note 
238, at 42. 
317.  AM. LAW INST., supra note 220, §305.1.  
318.  See supra Part IV.A. 
319.  WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-30-030(3)(a) (2011). 
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restrictions imposed on prisoners; the profound stresses of life in often-
overcrowded institutions; and the mental illnesses, addictions, anger, 
learning disabilities, poor education and socialization, youth, and 
general immaturity that so many inmates bring with them to prison.  On 
the other hand, a straight one-for-two credit seems an excessive reward 
for simply avoiding infractions, especially for older or longer-serving 
inmates who have had ample opportunity to adjust to prison life and 
develop habits of compliance.320  For many inmates, something more can 
and should be expected for full GCT—pro-social behavior that is more 
effortful and that offers more promise of a successful reintegration into 
free society.  Yet, there are potential administrative difficulties and 
inequities with making credit depend fully on programming; this ties 
GCT to the capacity and willingness of resource-starved corrections 
systems to make programming available to inmates, to the fit between 
an inmate’s needs and abilities and the programs available at the 
particular institution to which the inmate is assigned, and to the fairness 
of the lower-level correctional employees who may make key decisions 
about admission to and expulsion from the programs they manage.321 
To balance the competing interests, it is possible that individually 
customized, adjustable formulas could be devised for earning GCT.  
However, in order to maximize transparency and limit administrative 
costs, it seems preferable to adopt a simple half-and-half approach for 
everyone: remaining discipline-free is rewarded at a rate of 7.5 days per 
month (a potential one-sixth discount), which doubles to fifteen days 
per month (one-third) during months of active program participation.322  
 
320.  See, e.g., Liqun Cao, Jihong Zhao & Steve Van Dine, Prison Disciplinary Tickets: 
A Test of the Deprivation and Importation Models, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 103, 107 (1997) 
(“[D]isciplinary infraction rates are relatively high at the start of the prison sentences and 
peak within the first six to nine months of incarceration; thereafter, infraction rates show a 
steady downward trend over one’s stay in prison.”); Richard Tewksbury et al., supra note 162, 
at 203 (“Age has consistently been found to be the most important indicator for the 
likelihood of both violent and nonviolent disciplinary infractions.”). 
321.  Cf. MALCOLM C. YOUNG, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. 
OF LAW, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE TRUTH ABOUT “EARLY RELEASE” FROM 
ILLINOIS PRISONS 14 (2010), available at http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/files/setting-the-
record-straight.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7D5B-GJTF (noting that Illinois dropped 
program participation requirement for GCT in 1975 “since the Department [of Corrections] 
did not have enough programs for all prisoners who desired and were eligible to engage in 
them, [and] it was unfair to deny good time to prisoners who through no fault of their own 
could not participate in programs”). 
322.  Dean Demleitner supports a similar approach, Demleitner, supra note 170, at 794–
95, as does the Model Penal Code: Sentencing project, AM. LAW INST., supra note 220, 
§ 305.1.  Note, too, that the pre-1984 Wisconsin system also had a mixed approach, with 
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The Department of Corrections can by regulation define what programs 
qualify for the enhanced GCT, perhaps taking into account the best 
available evidence regarding which activities tend to reduce recidivism 
risk. 
3. Offense-Based Exclusions and Limitations 
Many states, including Illinois and Washington, have implemented 
multi-tier GCT systems, in which some offenders earn credits at reduced 
rates or are excluded from GCT altogether based on their offense of 
conviction or criminal history.  In this regard, the more uniform federal 
system offers the most appealing model.  This is consistent with ideals of 
simplicity and transparency.  Sentencing judges, attorneys, offenders, 
victims, and members of the public should be able quickly and easily to 
determine the potential impact of GCT on a prison term with minimal 
need for legal research or complex math.  A one-third discount for 
everyone is straightforward to comprehend and calculate. 
Multitier systems seem intended to deny or delay release for the 
classes of offenders who are believed to be the most dangerous.  Yet, 
these offenders have also presumably received the longest sentences.  
To then also preclude or restrict their ability to earn GCT seems a 
double penalty.  Moreover, the safeguard operates crudely and without 
regard to the full array of potentially important risk factors—risk factors 
that may change considerably over the course of a very long sentence.  It 
would be better to address public-safety concerns regarding potential 
GCT releases of truly dangerous inmates through a more nuanced 
decision-making process closer to the release date.  More about this 
below. 
4. Disciplinary Sanctions 
Some or all of the otherwise-available GCT should be withheld in 
months in which a substantial violation of prison rules is found.  Some 
effort should be made to prevent arbitrariness in the sanctioning system 
and wide institution-to-institution disparities.  For instance, Wisconsin 
should follow Washington’s lead in defining by regulation precisely 
which infractions can result in a loss of GCT.323  Whether the full 
amount, or only a fraction, of potential GCT should be withheld ought 
 
maximum GCT requiring “diligence in labor or study [that] surpasses the general average.”  
WIS. STAT. § 53.12(1) (1981–1982). 
323.  WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-25-030. 
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to be a matter of discretion, taking into account the usual sorts of 
considerations that go into disciplinary decisions. 
In some jurisdictions, including Washington, sanctions may include a 
forfeiture of already-earned GCT or a prospective loss of GCT in future 
months.324  Washington offsets the severity of such sanctions by 
permitting inmates to request that lost GCT be restored.325 
These aspects of the Washington system seem in tension with the 
goals of simplicity and transparency, and also heighten concerns about 
arbitrariness and disparity.  Wisconsin has now been running a prison 
disciplinary system for many years without a generalized ability to 
sanction inmates with a loss of any GCT, so it should not be viewed as 
necessary to arm corrections officials with heavy GCT sanctions in most 
cases now.  Losses beyond the current month should be restricted to 
only the most severe infractions, such as those that could be prosecuted 
as felonies in their own right outside the prison context.326  Additionally, 
the most GCT that can be lost for a single infraction should be capped at 
some specific amount—say, one year, as Illinois does.  And, if 
retroactive and prospective losses of GCT are minimized in this way, 
then there should be no need for a restoration system. 
5. Deferral of GCT Release 
In general, it seems fair to assume that the inmates who are most 
successful at accelerating their release dates with GCT will be among 
the safer bets for succeeding after release.  However, there will 
undoubtedly be some inmates who, notwithstanding good performance 
in prison, seem to present unacceptable risks at release.  As discussed 
above, Washington addresses this concern with a law that provides for 
continued incarceration for some inmates who do not have a release 
plan that satisfies certain standards, including those related to risk of re-
offense and community safety.327 
Washington’s approach—that is, requiring an approved release plan 
that adequately addresses basic risk issues before accrued GCT may be 
“cashed in”—seems a sensible safeguard, although its impact in practice 
 
324.  See, e.g., id. § 137-30-030(2)(c). 
325.  Id. § 137-30-070(2).  
326.  Cf. Demleitner, supra note 170, at 796 (“In light of the long prison sentences many 
inmates currently serve, good time should become irrevocable at a point to avoid the ongoing 
threat of loss of good time credits.  Surely prison systems have other, more immediate and 
harsher sanctions available should serious misconduct occur.”). 
327.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(5)(C) (West 2010 & Supp. 2014).  
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may be unnecessarily broad; in some recent years, nearly one-quarter of 
Washington’s releases have been delayed.328  Indeed, the state has 
undertaken measures to try to reduce these delays, such as providing 
rental vouchers for inmates whose release is deferred because of a lack 
of approved living arrangements.329   
In addition to making resources available to inmates in aid of 
reentry, Wisconsin should also adopt protections so as to minimize the 
risk that GCT releases will be delayed excessively by official 
arbitrariness, bureaucratic inertia, or purely subjective views of risk.  If 
an inmate who has submitted a timely release plan is deferred beyond a 
certain point—say, six months330—then the Department of Corrections 
should be required to provide a written explanation of why the inmate 
has not yet been released, with reference to an appropriate risk–needs 
assessment tool, and a specific plan for what the inmate must do in order 
to achieve release.  
6. Relationship to Extended Supervision 
An inmate released based on GCT would be treated like any other 
inmate released at the conclusion of the initial term of confinement.  
The inmate would be required to serve the full term of extended 
supervision under his sentence, which must be no less than twenty-five 
percent of the unreduced term of initial confinement.331  If revoked and 
returned to prison,332 then the inmate would be eligible to resume 
earning GCT toward the new period of confinement. 
Current rules provide for extensions by the Department of 
Corrections of the initial release date based on various types of 
misconduct.333  The new possibility of loss of GCT should largely or 
entirely obviate the need for these penalty provisions.  They might be 
eliminated, or more clearly restricted to the most severe misconduct in 
situations in which there is no additional GCT to be lost. 
 
328.  WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 277, at 2. 
329.  Id. 
330.  Delays in Washington have averaged between two and four months in recent years, 
id., so a similar system in Wisconsin would not likely result in large numbers of plans delayed 
beyond six months. 
331.  WIS. STAT. § 973.01(2)(d) (2011–2012). 
332.  Id. § 302.113(9)(am). 
333.  Id. § 302.113(3). 
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7. Fair Notice 
When imposing a prison term, the sentencing judge should be 
required to state that the offender will be eligible to earn a limited time 
off for good behavior in prison and to indicate when the offender will be 
released if he earns the maximum amount of GCT.  The judge should 
also make clear that earning this maximum amount will require the 
offender not only to stay out of trouble in prison, but also to participate 
in programs that will help to prepare the offender for a successful return 
to the community. 
The DOC should be required to maintain up-to-date information on 
its website regarding how much GCT each inmate has earned and the 
current projected release date of each inmate in light of GCT credits.334  
GCT credits and adjustments to release dates should also be 
incorporated into the DOC’s victim notification service.335  Given 
contemporary technological capabilities and the sort of straightforward, 
objective, limited GCT system described here, there is no reason for 
interested victims ever to be caught off guard by a GCT release.  
Additionally, in the further interest of transparency, the DOC should be 
required to make public annual reports of how much GCT credit it is 
awarding and revoking, as is mandated in Illinois for that state’s 
supplemental GCT program.336 
8. Effective Date and Retroactivity 
Implementing the proposed system will require a certain amount of 
administrative rulemaking, as well as education for judges, lawyers, and 
corrections personnel.  In order to allow adequate time for these 
activities, the system should apply only to offenders convicted of crimes 
committed on or after its effective date, and the effective date should be 
set at least twelve months after GCT is adopted by the Legislature.   
Once the system is operational, there would be benefits to extending 
it to prisoners who were convicted of crimes committed prior to the 
effective date.  However, doing so would raise serious fair notice 
objections on behalf of victims and might also undercut assumptions 
about release that were material to some charging, plea-bargaining, and 
sentencing decisions.  It would thus seem better to adopt a presumption 
against retroactivity.  There might, however, be some flexibility in 
 
334.  See supra note 143. 
335.  See supra note 143. 
336.  ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 261. 
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permitting some “pre-GCT” inmates to petition to be able to receive 
credits.  These petitions could be handled under the existing judicial 
sentence-adjustment provision, which includes notification requirements 
for prosecutors and victims.337  In order to prevent a flood of petitions 
and to focus judicial attention on those cases in which retroactivity 
would most likely be appropriate and meaningful, petitions might be 
limited to nonviolent, non-sexual offenders who have served at least half 
of their initial term of confinement and who have at least two years left 
on this term.338  The grant of a petition would allow the inmate to begin 
accruing GCT credits the next month. 
C. Differences From 2009 Reforms 
A proposal to adopt GCT in Wisconsin might seem on its face an 
effort to revive the rejected 2009 Doyle reforms.  However, any 
similarities to the 2009 reforms should not lead to rejection of the 
present proposal. 
First, and most fundamentally, it is important to recall that the 2009 
reforms were not rejected on the basis of any persuasively demonstrated 
operational problems, but rather for political reasons.339  Moreover, 
while the 2009 reforms included what was in effect a GCT component 
(“positive adjustment time”), the critique of these reforms did not focus 
in any specific way on this component, and had considerably more force 
as to the more discretionary components.340 
Second, the 2009 reforms contained no limitations on retroactivity, 
but made GCT available on all equal basis to TIS inmates, without 
regard to date of offense or sentencing.341  Such an approach not only 
raises important fair notice concerns,342 but also exacerbates public-
safety concerns in light of the potential (or at least perceived potential) 
for a near-term surge in returning inmates before local authorities and 
the community supervision system have time to prepare.  My proposal 
 
337.  WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2011–2012). 
338.  Pre-TIS inmates might be excluded from this process on the ground that they have 
an alternative early release opportunity available to them in the form of parole review. 
339.  See supra Part II.E. 
340.  See supra Part III. 
341.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009–2010) (making positive adjustment time 
available to certain classes of offenders sentenced under § 973.01 without regard to date); 
WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(1)–(2) (2009–2010) (same). 
342.  See supra Part VII.B.8. 
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contemplates a much slower unfolding and a reduced likelihood that 
release-date expectations at sentencing will be badly disappointed. 
Third, my proposal, unlike the 2009 reforms, requires participation 
in approved programming in order to receive maximum credit. 
Finally, my proposal includes fair-notice provisions that were not 
part of the 2009 reforms.343 
In sum, although my proposal in overall effect might be fairly 
characterized as one that would reestablish a system of moderate 
determinacy in Wisconsin, this system would differ in several important 
respects from the moderate-determinacy regime that was in place 
between 2009 and 2011. 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
Wisconsin’s present regime of hyper-determinacy cuts against the 
grain of national norms, public opinion in the state, and the state’s own 
longstanding traditions of release-date flexibility.  The arguments for 
hyper-determinacy reflect overly simplistic views of democratic 
accountability, victim rights, and public safety.  It is time for Wisconsin 
to provide more meaningful recognition of the positive things offenders 
can do while they are behind bars.  While the nation as a whole has been 
moving away from the prison-as-warehouse model, Wisconsin policy 
still seems stuck in the cynical and harshly punitive attitudes of the 
1990s.  
 There are a variety of mechanisms by which greater flexibility may 
be returned to the corrections system, and a reasonable case may be 
made for a number of different approaches.  However, since the 1970s, 
in Wisconsin and nationally, there has been greater emphasis on 
transparency, predictability, objectivity, and uniformity in punishment.  
A system of good conduct time modeled on Washington’s would respect 
these important values,344 while also providing appropriate 
 
343.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 973.01(8) (2009–2010) (indicating various aspects of 
sentence that must be explained, but not including positive adjustment time); WIS. STAT. 
§ 973.01(8) (2010–2011) (same). 
344.  Discretionary parole, by contrast, may be harder to square with these values.  Cf. 
GOODSTEIN, supra note 170, at 46 (noting that Illinois prisoners sentenced under new 
determinate system with large GCT component expressed more positive views about equity 
of system than did prisoners sentenced under old parole system).  For a more extended 
discussion of the advantages of GCT over parole, see Larkin, supra note 238, at 40–41.  
Professor Cecelia Klingele proposes a third approach to back-end flexibility, judicial sentence 
modification.  Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial 
Sentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 
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encouragement and recognition for positive behavior in prison.  
“[G]ood time is crucial,” as Dean Demleitner observes, “as a symbol of 
hope and rehabilitative potential in an overly harsh penal regime.”345 
 
 
465–66 (2010).  Based in part on the controversy over Illinois’s abortive expansion of GCT in 
2009, Klingele argues that judicial sentence modification may be preferable to GCT from the 
standpoint of transparency, accountability, and political sustainability.  Id. at 496–98, 515–21.  
In this Essay, I have attempted to address transparency and accountability concerns with 
GCT.  See supra Parts III.A, III.B, VII.  Additionally, as Part V demonstrates, GCT has 
proven itself remarkably durable over many decades; the 2009 Illinois controversy was the 
exception, not the rule.  See also Larkin, supra note 238, at 41 (“[G]ood-time laws 
significantly predate the birth of parole and never have been the subject of the type of 
intensive, sustained criticism that ultimately withered parole.  In the eyes of the public, good-
time laws have earned a presumption of respectability that parole lacks today.”).  In any 
event, there is nothing operationally or philosophically incompatible between GCT and 
judicial sentence modification, which may function in a complementary manner.  Indeed, in 
light of all of the limitations on GCT in my proposal, there would still undoubtedly be a need 
for a reexamination of the sentences of many individuals still serving time in prison long after 
there is any demonstrable need for them to do so. 
345.  Demleitner, supra note 170, at 796. 
